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CHAPTER I
SWISS HISTORY AND NEUTRALITY:
THE BASIS FOR NAZI
GERMANY'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SWITZERLAND
The accession to power of the National Socialist
Party in Germany represented a threat to Switzerland
in two respects.

Not only was the Nazi Fuehrer-Principle

diametrically opposed to the Swiss concept of democracy,
but more importantly the Reich's race principle extended
beyond Germany's borders to all of Europe<>

The Swiss

viewed the latter principle as a particular threat,
since Switzerland was historically and culturally
related to the Reich, and the German-speaking Swiss
accounted for seventy per cent of the state's total
population.
The basis for the race principle had been laid
down in 1920 in Article I of the Program of the German
Workers’ Party, which read:

"We demand the union of

all Germans in a Pan German State (gross Deutschland)
in accordance with the right of all peoples to selfdetermination."^

Four years later, in Mein Kampf, Hitler

further emphasized that the "Reich must embrace all
1

Konrad Heiden, A History of National Socialism
(N.Y., 1935)> 14-1*3 passim.
1

2
Germans«”

2

Although the theoretical foundations for a

Pan German state had evolved long before the Nazi acces
sion, it was only after 1933 that the Reich was able to
put this theory into practice.
To stress the importance of its views toward
Germans abroad, the National Socialist Party developed
the concept of the German folk-community (Volksgemeinschaft), to which all Germans, regardless of their place
of residence, owed allegiance0

The basic principles

of the folk-community were embodied in Vom Wesen der
Yolksgemeinschaft, which stated:
Adolf Hitler has set his stamp on the world
folk-communityo
This word is to make completely
clear to the members of our people that the indi
vidual is nothing when not a member of the community
of men of the same origin, same language, and same
culture, ioe0 the folk-community. „ 0 o
The German folk-community includes not only
all those who- are members of the NSDAP, it includes
all who by origin, language, and culture belong to
the folk-community and in accordance with the rigid
laws of nature acknowledge their allegiance- to the
German folk-community
The task of spreading the principles of the
folk-community fell to the Foreign Organization of the
NSDAP (Auslands Organisation or AO der NSDAP)„

This

body, through propaganda and agitation, worked to make
Germans living abroad, as well as foreign citizens of
^Adolf Hitler, Mein Kampf, trans„ R 0 Manheim
(Boston, 1943), 39$o
% . S 0, State Dept., National Socialism: Basic
Principles, their Application by the Foreign Organization,
iind the Use of Germans Abroad for Nazi Aims (Wash. ? 1940),
I ’l l
/Hereafter cited as State Dept., National Socialism./

3
German extraction, conscious of their kinship to the
Third Reich and of the fact that they owed to it their
sole allegianceo

Citizenship in a foreign country held

no meaning for members of the folk-community«,

The Bremen

Nachrichten.reiterated this fact stating:
The Tolksdeutscher living in foreign states
must know--besides the natural obligations of the,
German toward his host— that he must remain loyal
to his nationality (Volkstum); it is to this he
owes the highest values
Switzerland became a primary target for folkcommunity propaganda and agitation soon after Hitler
became chancellor in. January 1933 <> Switzerland , accord
ing to the .League for Germaftdom in Foreign Countries,
was the home of.2,$60,000 Germans*
Two characteristics of Swiss history were particu
larly significant in the formation of Nazi Germany’s
policy toward Switzerlando

First of all, the origin and

nature of the Swiss Confederation were German„

And

second, neutrality had been the basic principle of Swit
zerland’s relations with the rest of Europe since the
sixteenth century.,
When Henry I united the Germanic peoples in a
single empire in 919* most of present-day Switzerland
^Bremen Nachrichten, as quoted in State DeptOJ
National Socialism,, 73«
^State Depto, National Socialism, 421*
The
figure of 2,$60,000 is quoted from a Nazi source and
represents the number of German-speaking Swiss. The
total number of German nationals in Switzerland did
not exceed a few hundred thousand*

4
came under the control of the new empire0

Various members

of the Swiss nobility, notably the counts of Zurich,
enjoyed a close friendship with the Imperial House, and
in return the Emperors often stayed in German Switzer
land.,

Henry II held Imperial Diets in Zurich in 1004

and 101$.

By 1032 all of Switzerland was included in

the Holy Roman Empire and was governed by the dukes of
ZaehringenB

Ultimately, in the thirteenth century the

counts of Habsburg became imperial bailiffs of Switzer.land o
With the decline of the Empire’s power in the
thirteenth century it became necessary for the cantons
to undertake measures for their own government and defense,
previously the Crown’s most important activities„

In

effect, the cantons became relatively free of imperial
control and resented the subsequent attempts of the
Habsburgsto extend their authority over Swiss terri
tory „

In order to preserve their independence, the Swiss

cantons turned to Emperor Frederick II, who realizing
that he had neither the power to defend the cantons
nor to force them into subservience, granted them charters
as free communities within the Empire0

The people of

Uri received their charter in 1231 and those of Schwyz
in 1240 0

Through granting the charters Frederick hoped

to retain for himself the free passage over the strategic

5
6
Alpine passes„
The charters of 1231 and 1240 enabled Uri and
Schwyz to accept imperial sovereignty rather than become
personal possessions of the Habsburgs, who eventually
would have inherited the communities0
When Rudolf of Habsburg was elected Holy Roman
Emperor in 1273 > imperial and feudal overlordship over
the Swiss cantons passed into his hands, and he began
to increase his holdings in central Switzerland while
exercising more actively his feudal rights in Uri and
Schwyzo

To prevent further loss of their liberty at

the hands of the Habsburgs, Uri and Schwyz sought se
curity through unity0

In 1291 they extended an invita

tion to the leaders of Unterwalden, which had recently
come under Habsburg rule, to meet with them and prepare
a common plan of action0

The meeting of these three small

forest cantons resulted in creation of the "Perpetual
League" for common defense, which is considered the actual
beginning of Swiss political development0

For the next

two centuries, Swiss history was dominated by an increase
in cantons bound together by similar alliances „

7

During this period the League proved its
^George A 0 Codding Jrc, The Federal Government
of Switzerland (Boston, 1961), 210
^Lucerne joined the alliance in 1332; Zurich
in 1351; Glarus and Zug in 1352; Berne in 1353; Fribourg
and Solothurn in 14&1; Basel and Schaffhausen in 1501;
Appenzell in 1513°

6
effectiveness on a number of occasions0

In 1315, the

three original cantons defeated. Duke Leopold at Morgarten,
after he had attempted to reimpose his family’s authority
on Schwyz and Unterwalden.o

Following the victory at

Morgarten the cantons adopted the name Swiss Confedera
tion o

As a confederation of eight members, the Swiss

defeated the invading Austrians again in 13$6 at Sempach
and in 13$$ at Jaefels, permanently ending Habsburg
attempts to extend their authority over the Confederation<>
By 1499? two additional members had joined the
Confederation, and the Swiss finally threw off the yoke
of the Empire after defeating the forces of Emperor
Maximilian I in the 1499 Swabian War*

By the terms of

the Peace of Basel, September 22, 1499, the Swiss were
freed from imperial obligations, although official recognition of the Confederation’s independent status was with
held until.the 164$ Peace of Westphalia0
Initially, the three forest cantons had consti
tuted a nucleus around which gathered all those districts
between the Jura, Rhine and Alps opposed to Habsburg
A
rule0

At this time the members of the Confederation

were without exception German-speaking0
Until 1515, when Francis I of France defeated
the Swiss at Marignano, Switzerland had enjoyed two
% i l l i am Oechsli, History of Switzerland, 14991914 (N„Yo, 1922), 2o /Hereafter cited as Oechsli, History
of Switzerlando7

7
centuries of military, success,,

The French .victory put

an end to the Swiss legend of invincibility and marked
the beginning of Switzerland’s withdrawal from European
affairso

FollowingMarignano, the Swiss as allies of

France shared in the defeats at La Bicocca in 1522 and
Pavia in 1525.

Thereafter the Swiss were content to

refrain.from further warlike expeditions and began to
turn to neutrality as the basic principle of their for
eign .policy,,
The concept of Swiss neutrality is not completely
covered by the doctrines of international law*

It must

be understood as a unique political entity which has
grown with the state,.has changed through centuries of
growth and has thus become an essential factor in the
9
historical individuality of the Swiss State„
Initially,
armed neutrality became the nation’s fixed policy, and
foreign powers became accustomed to regard this policy
as firmly established0

It was not until 1674 that the

Diet of the Confederation declared perpetual and absolute
neutrality t o .be the principle of its foreign policy„
The decision to rely upon neutrality was the result
of both internal and external causes„

While. Swiss troops

had enjoyed considerable military success during the
previous centuries, the individual cantons were not always
9
Walter Hofer, Neutrality as the Principle of
Swiss Foreign Policy (Zurich, 195777 67~~2,Hereafter cited
as Hofer, Neutrality,/

g
at peace.

Dissention between the small agrarian cantons

and the strong urban cantons over economic policies
caused unrest.

At other times, the foreign policies of

the individual cantons conflicted, causing additional
problems.

Finally, the immediate effect of the Reformation

was to strain the already weak ties of the Confederation.
By far, the most important external cause for Switzer
land’s declaration of neutrality was the rise of the
Balance of Power in Europe.

Switzerland actually lived

on the jealousy and rivalry of its great neighbors.
In essence, t h e .equilibrium of rival great powers is the
air in which the neutrality of small states thrives,
while the greatest threat to their existence is the
ascendancy of. a single power.

11

For this reason Swit

zerland, with Great Britain, was the most consistent
advocate of the Balance of Power in Europe throughout the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Throughout these centuries, foreign powers re
garded Switzerland mainly.as a field for procuring mer
cenaries, and the Swiss concluded capitulation agreements
with most European powers.

In 17&7, it was calculated

that the number of capitulated Swiss soldiers (serving
with cantonal approval and in accordance with treaties)
•^Hofer, Neutrality, S.
-^Edward Bonjour, Swiss Neutrality:
Its History
and Meaning (London, 194$ K 18. /Hereafter cited as
Bonjour, Swiss Neutrality./

9
in foreign service was 3^?000o^

However, while Swiss

soldiers were found all over Europe, the Swiss people
were turning away from the mercenary profession,,

Con-

sequently, in the course of the eighteenth century Swit
zerland became one of the worst armed countries in Europe
At the same time, the other powers were beginning to
rely upon their own national armies, and the recruiting
of mercenaries gradually died out, removing the last
contingency which might involve the nation in a European
disputeo
The armies of Revolutionary France presented the
first major threat to Swiss neutrality.since the Thirty
Tears’ War, during which both camps of belligerents
attempted to enlist the Swiss on their side0

Following

the French declaration of war on Austria on April 20,
1792, the Swiss Diet ordered the fortification of the
frontier near Basel and declared its customary neutrality,
including Geneva, Neuchatel and the bishopric of Basel
in the declaration„

French respect for neutrality de

creased in proportion to the success of its armies, and
in 1797 the regions of Naltelline, Chiavenna and Bormia
were separated from Switzerland and added to the Cisal
pine Republic„

The rest of Switzerland was renamed the

Helvetic Republic, charged with a heavy indemnity and
120echsli, History of Switzerland, 237.
13Ibido

10
permanently allied to France,,

Five years later Napoleon

intervened to settle domestic strife in the Republic and
forced the Act of Mediation upon the Swiss.

The Act

transformed the Republic into the Swiss Confederation,
which became a French satellite, and not until Napoleon’s
defeat did the Swiss regain their independence.
On March 20, 1S15, the Five Great Powers signed
a joint declaration recognizing the perpetual neutrality
of Switzerland as ”corresponding to the true interests
of all European S t a t e s T h e

November Act of Neutrality,

as the joint declaration became known, provided the foundation for Swiss neutrality throughout the nineteenth century
and marked the incorporation of Swiss neutrality in inter
national law.

Although the Swiss welcomed the international

guarantee of their neutrality, they were not content to rely
solely upon its effectiveness.

The Confederation saw in the

maintenance of its own military forces the strongest guar
antee of its neutrality.

Thus perpetual and armed neutrality

became the basis for Switzerland’s policy„
On the eve of World War I, Switzerland announced
its intention to remain neutral in a declaration to the
powers which reads
. . o the Federal Council formally declares that
during the war which is about to begin, the Swiss
Confederation will maintain and defend with all the
means it has at its disposal, the integrity and the
H H o f e r , Neutrality, 11-12.

11
inviolability of the Swiss territory, as they have
been recognized by the Treaties of 1815
Throughout the war Switzerland

successfully fol

lowed, the. course which had been proclaimed in August,
although the Swiss, did find themselves drawn into the
anti-German blockade, which was a violation of the prin
ciple of neutrality,,

In general however , Switzerland

attempted to maintain equal trade with

both camps of

belligerents for as long as possible„
Following the war, the signatories of the Treaty
of Versailles recognized in Article 435 that n 8 e. 0 the
guarantees stipulated in favor of Switzerland by the
Treaties of 1815 and especially the Act of November 20,
1815 constitute international obligations for the maintenance of peace,O00n

The traditional concept of

rehirality which the Swiss had practiced for centuries ;
was re-emphasized and its incorporation in international
law verifiedo
The term neutrality implied that Switzerland would
maintain a policy of impartiality in its foreign relations.
However, the Council of the League of Nations was anxious
to secure Swiss adherence to the League, an organization
based upon collective security.

But accession to the

^ D , H , Miller„ The Drafting of the Covenant (N.I.,
1928) I 9 429» /Hereafter cited as Miller, Drafting of the
"1zl
Allied and Associated Powers, The Treaties of
Peace, 1919-1923 (N.T., 1924), I, 257»

12

League and absolute neutrality were policies which excluded
each other*

Collective security implied confederation,

partiality, intervention, whereas neutrality implied
aloofness, impartiality and abstention*

Therefore, the

two principles could neither in theory nor in practice
exist together*"^

A means had to be found to reconcile

the two opposites *
The Swiss delegation to Paris also heartily
approved of the creation of the League of Nations, since
‘ such an organization, if successful, would be an asset
to Swiss neutrality and independence*

Therefore, Swit

zerland was anxious not only to join the League, but
also to see the League situated in Geneva where all
members would be aware of Switzerland’s special position*
On February 14? 1919» the Swiss delegation at
Paris issued,a "Memorandum Concerning Swiss Neutrality,"
an authoritative statement on Swiss neutrality, in which
Switzerland’s devotion to the principle of neutrality
for the past centuries was reviewed*

The first portion

examined the value of Swiss neutrality to Europe, especially
in time of war*

It stated in part:

Switzerland must remain in the future, as she
has in the past, the trusty guardian of the passes
of the Alps*
In this war, like already in 1S71, Switzerland
■^HoJ* Morgenthau, "The End of Switzerland’s
’Differential’ Neutrality," American Journal of Inter
national Law XXII (193$) > 559"! 2 ^ erea^t-er cited as
Morgenthau, "Differential Neutrality,£7

13
could render humanity far greater services than she
could have done in taking part in the struggle * * 0 <,
An island of peace in the midst of the storm* Switzer*
land could provide for the hospitalization and re
patriation of victims of the war* * „ * Finally*
the Swiss Confederation was enabled by its neutrality
to contribute to fill the gap which had been left
through the rupture of diplomatic relations between
belligerents*
The second portion of the Memorandum laid the
basis for Switzerland’s policy in the future in relation
to t h e .establishment of the League *

It stated s

if Switzerland will remain true to.her
traditions 'and principles * she will occupy 'in the
League* for the benefit of all confederate states*
the place which is assigned to her by neutrality*19
Basically* Switzerland sought to reconcile the
idea of collective security with the concepts of neutrality
and inviolability of Swiss territory*

In a subsequent

memorandum of general comments on the Draft of February 14*
1919* the Swiss delegation further discussed the value
of Swiss neutrality to the League in time of war*
If Switzerland was to sacrifice her neutrality
in a war which is waged against an illegitimate war*
her neutrality would scarcely be respected in all
ordinary cases of war*
Switzerland believes* 0 * 0
that o o * she could render greater service by her
neutrality than in taking an active part in a cam
paign * * o o
It is understood that neutrality could not be
interpreted as allowing any sort0of assistance to
be given to States in conflict*
In an attempt to join the League with at least a
iS

Miller* Drafting of the Covenant 9 I* 429=31 passim,

l9Ibidos 43I*
20Ibido, 302-304,

14
portion of its neutrality preserved, the Swiss Confedera
tion introduced on April 11* 1919, an amendment to Article
16 of the Covenant„

Had the amendment been accepted, it

would have changed the Article to read s
The Members of the League agree that 0 „ „ on the
request of the Council they will take necessary steps
to afford passage through their territory to the
forces of any of the Members of the League which
are co-operating to protect the Covenant, of the
League, 1
The Swiss amendment was rejected, however0

Presi

dent Wilson, with the support of the French delegation
opposed the measure0

The opponents argued that the

obligation of the League to guarantee Swiss neutrality
was inconsistent with the Covenant„

The Swiss, on the

other hand, were determined to be allowed to object to
free passage of troops over their territory and made
further attempts to obtain some sort of declaration to
replace the amendment„

It was suggested that President

Wilson might refer to Swiss neutrality as being under
Article 21 of the Covenant, the "Monroe Doctrine Article„”
Wilson, however, made no reference to Swiss neutrality
as being included in Article 21 in his April 28 speech
to the Plenary Session of the Peace Conference„

Conse

quently, the delegates ignored Switzerland’s position
when the final draft was completed,,

No loophole was left

21Miller, Drafting of the Covenant, I, J+280

through which Switzerland might enter the League with
its neutrality intact,
Article 20 stipulated "that this Covenant is
accepted as abrogating all obligations or understandings
inter se which are inconsistent with the terms thereof 0 0
22
o
But Article 21 seemed to offer the possibility
of inclusion, in the League and maintenance of neutrality,,
The "Monroe Doctrine Article" read:
Nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to
affect the validity of international agreements,
such as treaties of arbitration or regional under
standings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing
the maintenance of peace,"^3
The Swiss Federal Council considered Swiss neutral
ity to be precisely an "international agreement for
securing.the maintenance of peace,"

Article 435 of the

Versailles Treaty, as previously mentioned, did in fact
recognize the. 1^15 Treaties guaranteeing...Swiss neutrality
as "international obligations for the maintenance of
peace,"2^

On the basis of the "Monroe Doctrine Article"

and Article 435 of the Treaty of Versailles, Switzerland
sought to enter the. League without making reservations.
Accordingly, the Swiss Federal Council sent.a note to
all Powers represented on the Council, requesting a
definition of Switzerland ?s status as a member,
22Miller, Drafting of the Covenant„ I, 690-91,
23Ibido, II, 691,
2^Allied and Associated Powers, The Treaties of
Peace „ 1919=1923 (N,Yo, 1924), I, 257,

16
The outcome of the Swiss request was the London
Declaration of February 13 , 1920 which found Swiss neutral
ity compatible with the Covenant.«

The. League members

recognized that ”Switzerland is in a unique situations,
based on a tradition of several centuries which had been
25

explicitly incorporated in the Law of Nations0n '

The

treaties of 1615 and Article 435 were found to coincide
with Switzerland’s position on neutrality0

Switzerland

for its part recognized the duties of solidarity which
League membership imposed, including;
o o o the duty therein of co-operating in such eco
nomic and financial measures as may be demanded by
the League against a covenant-breaking State, and
is prepared to make every sacrifice to defend her
own territory under every circumstance, even during
operations undertaken by the League of Nations, but
will not be obliged to take part in any military
action or to allow the passage of foreign troops
or the preparations of military operations within
her territory„
As a consequence of the London Declaration,
Switzerland adopted a policy of differential, or partial
neutrality, which provided a means to maintain the status
of neutrality within a system of collective security
Ironically, when the proposal for Swiss membership
in the League was presented to the Swiss electorate for
approval by referendum, the measure passed by a majority
of only 415,^19 to 323 ,225.
0

Eleven and a half cantons

^ L e a g u e of Nations, Official Journal (March,
1920), 57-56o
26Ibid0
^Morgenthau, ?,Differential Neutrality,” 559»

17
were carried for the League, ten and a half against ito
A change in ninety-four votes in Appenzell Exterior would
2B
have tied the state vote and defeated the League0
Differential neutrality remained the basis for Swiss for
eign policy for only eighteen years0 - By 1 9 3 Switzer
land’s discontent with the failures of the League, coupled
with pressure from Germany , caused the Federal Council
to rescind differential neutrality in favor of returning
to its traditional..policy of absolute neutralitjo
In. 1933 ?• Nazi Germany could view Switzerland ,
on the. basis of its origin., language and culture, as a
member.of the German.folk-community„

Switzerland’s

origin had indeed been. German, and t h e .country had been
historically tied to Germany— directly and indirectly—
for over a thousand years.

Of the twenty-five cantons,

nineteen were predominantly German, a n d .seventy-two
percent of the population of 4,000,000 spoke German0^^
Nazi references to Switzerland as the "Suedmark” were
not entirely unfounded*
By 1933» Swiss neutrality had been .an established
tradition for over 400 years, while its incorporation
in international law dated from 1S15*

Following World

2$
EoCo Brooks, "Swiss Referendum on the League
of Nations," American Political Science Review, XIV
(August, 1920), 477“SOo
29coEo Black and E 0C 0 Helmreich, Twentieth Century
Europe (N.Y*, 1963), 329«

IS
War. .Is, the desire, to be included in the League had led
the Swiss government to drift away f rom the nation's
established tradition of absolute neutrality,,

As of

F e b r u a r y 2 0 9 1920,. differential neutrality replaced

abso

lute neutrality as the principle of Swiss, foreign policy,,
and Switzerland implicitly drifted into the orbit of the
victors of 191$o

The Weim a r Republic accepted and g e n 

erally favored Switzerland's entry into the League, while
German nationalist elements desired to see the proposal
vetoedo

Relations between the two countries were not

strained until Hitler came to power, after which d i f f e r 
ential ne u t r a l i t y and Swiss membership in the League
were continually a t t a c k e d 0

CHAPTER II
GERMANY’S ATTITUDE TOWARD SWISS NEUTRALITY, 1933-1940
German foreign policy during the Nazi era was com
plicated by the State-Party dualism resulting from the
influence of the National .Socialist Party in the German
Foreign Office.,,

In effect, the Foreign Organization of

the NSDAP"*' competed with the Foreign Office in the direc
tion of policy and, in general, hindered the work of the
lattero

Initially under the direction of pre-Nazi diplomats,

the Foreign.Office aimed at inducing Switzerland to return
to its traditional policy of perpetual, absolute neutrality
which had been compromised when the Swiss joined the League
of Nationso

The success of this policy required that

nothing be done by Germany which would prejudice GermanSwiss relationso

On the contrary, the Foreign Office

intended to assure Switzerland that Nazi Germany constituted
•**The first Party organization concerned with the
problems of Germans abroad was formed in 1930 in Hamburg,,
In 1933» the organization came under the direction of Ernst
Bohle, a protege of Hitler’s Deputy, Rudolf Hess„ Two years
later, Foreign Office officials were inducted into the
Foreign Organization as a professional group, insuring
collaboration of diplomats abroad with Party agents„ The
Foreign Organization received definitive sanction in 1937
when it was designated as the Foreign Organization in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs„ Although Bohle was placed
under the Foreign Minister, the Foreign Ministry exercised
only a very general control over his work.
19

20
a threat neither

to Swiss neutrality nor independences,

hoping that the Swiss would sever their ties w i t h the
League once it was clear that Germany had no designs on
Switzerland0

On the other hand, in 1933 the Foreign Organiza
tion began to put into practice the theory of the German
"folk-community,” which.aimed at uniting all Germans in
a "greater Germany,” based upon self-determination <>

Un

like the Foreign Office which operated through diplomatic
channels, the Foreign Organization appealed directly to
the Swiss people through the press, propaganda and politi
cal agitation, emphasizing vociferously that the Swiss,
because of their long historical association with Germany,
were destined to be incorporated in Hitler?s Reich0

Con

sequently, the Swiss were impressed with the fact that
the new German regime represented a potential threat to
their independence®
According to the German Minister to Berne, Swit=
zerland had viewed the Versailles Treaty as unwise if
not unjust, but preferred maintenance of the status quo
to a new w a r 0

The realization in 1933 that Germany had

not reconciled itself to defeat came as a shock to the
Swisso

Suddenly they saw Nazi Germany as capable of

anything--marehing on France through Switzerland, o v e r 
whelming Austria, and possibly annexing Switzerland's

German-speaking cantons„

Simultaneously, Switzerland

began to awaken from the misconception that the League
had secured permanent peace»

The Swiss still considered

the League to be better than nothing, for it at least
provided a speaking platform for the smaller countries
and served as a court of appeals0

For these reasons Swit

zerland continued to support the League and tried to per
suade Germany to co-operate again„
In 1933 > the Swiss government, although concerned
about German designs on Switzerland, adopted an entirely cor3
rect attitude toward Nazi Germany,>

Initially, the press and

public opinion followed the lead of the government, but both
quickly became critical of developments to the north0
Recalling that the Swiss had experienced a similar
reaction to Italian Fascism, Germany adopted a philosophi
cal attitude toward Switzerland0

It was assumed that the

Swiss would eventually become accustomed to National
Socialism and possibly accept the doctrine themselves„
In contrast to the majority of the Swiss who op
posed National Socialism, the reaction among some right
ist circles was positive0

In addition to the pro-Nazi

parties already in existence, three new parties, the
Association of National Socialist Confederates, the Con
federate Front, and the Movement for National Revival
2U 0S o , State Depto Documents on German Foreign Policy
191S-1945 s /Hereafter cited,~as^ l ^ 7 ~ r r T r i l a s h o , 19497, 771
3 Ibido, I, 6$20

were formed„

While pursuing different individual aims,

the three organizations jointly professed a belief in the
ideology of National Socialism,,

The Association of

National Socialist Confederates, most extreme of the groups
sought incorporation of Switzerland in the "fatherland”
and hailed Hitler as their "liberatoro"^

Although the

membership of such organizations remained very small,
Germany interpreted their formation as a significant
gain for the Reicho
The German Legation in Berne, headed by Adolf
Mueller

5

and Ernst von Weizsaeker,

6

his successor, began

a systematic study of the Swiss mentality and attitude,
the results of which were to be used as a basis for Germany
future policy toward Switzerland,

Mueller observed that

the Swiss desire for freedom had undergone no change
since the Middle Ages and that the Swiss still retained
the desire for undisturbed freedom.

In a memorandum to

the Foreign Office, he recommended that Germany issue an
^'GoEoWo Johnson, "Switzerland is Next,” North
American Review, CCXXXVII (1934), 524-25o
cited as Johnson, "Switzerland is Nexto^/
^Adolf Mueller had held the post in Berne since
World War I„ Although he was a Social Democrat, he was
allowed to remain at Berne for more than six months after
the accession of the Nazi Party <>
^Ernst von Weizsaeker (1SB2-1951), entered the
diplomatic service of the Weimar Republic in 1920, serving
as Minister to Norway, 1931-1933<> Under Hitler he held
the following posts: 1933-1936, Minister to Switzerland;
1936-1933, Head of the Political Department in the Foreign
Ministry; 193&-1943, State Secretary; 1943-1945, Ambassador
to the Holy SeeG
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official statement of respect for Swiss neutrality0

In

regard to Nazi propaganda in Switzerland, he observed:
For the propagandistic treatment of Switzerland
and particularly for the German section, it is my
experience, that great reserve and unobtrusiveness
are necessary0 0 o 0
Abrupt advice and long-winded polemics would only
provoke more resistance, whereas with a calm attitude
by us the correcting will occur in the country by
itself0 For indeed the basic mood in German Switzerland is entirely German, and the furor Helveticus
awakens only when misgivings are aroused concerning
infringement of Swiss independence0?
From the beginning, the Foreign Organization
branches in Switzerland had an adverse effect on the Swiss„
Their overzealous agitation most often met with opposition
More importantly, however, very few Swiss were attracted
by Nazi Germanyfs emphasis on race and the possible inclu
sion of Switzerland in Hitler’s "greater Germanyo"

The

Confederation would not have survived long, had its three
national elements— German, French and Italian-emphasized
their own superiority and tried to subdue the others <>

The

result would have been the dissolution of the state and its
partition by Switzerland’s powerful neighbors0

It was, in

fact, the de-emphasis of German, French and Italian nation
alism that had enabled Switzerland to continue its existence0
Hence, no Swiss, particularly the German Swiss, were inter
ested in seeing Nazi racism gain a foothold, in Switzerland„
The immediate effect of the propaganda directed
toward Switzerland was to cause concern among Swiss leaders
7DGFP, G, I, 6S2-S3 o
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over the country's ability to defend its neutrality and
g
independenceo. The Head of the Swiss Military Department,
Federal Councillor Minger,

9

in a speech on July 9, 1933

asked for a considerable increase in the nation's military
budgeto

He justified the increase on the belief that in

a future war there would be a race between the belligerent
neighboring countries to gain control of strategically

10

located Switzerland0

Since Switzerland alone would never

be a match for the French or German forces , the Swiss
planned to detain any invading force at the frontier un
til the other neighbor came to its assistance0

Thus Swit

zerland would automatically become the ally of France should
Germany attack Switzerland0

On the other hand, the Swiss

would ostensibly ally themselves with Germany in the event
of a French violation of the Swiss frontiero
The approval of Minger’s request by the Federal
Council was in Germany’s political and military interest0
Maintenance of Swiss neutrality by a sufficiently strong
and adequately armed force provided a flank protection
exceedingly desirable to Germany in case of military
£>
A characteristic example of Nazi propaganda was
a declaration in which Germany declared itself ready to
’’free the 2 ,■000,000 Germans living under the Swiss yokeo”
Quoted from the New York Times, Augo 29 §> 1933? 1°
^Rudolf Minger (1&&1-1955); Chief of the Swiss
Military Department, 1933-1945; elected President of the
Swiss Confederation in 1929o
10DGFP9 C, I, 6S0o
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11
conflicts between Germany and France„

The possibility

of a French preventive war against Germany could not be
dismissed, in the early period of the Reich, particularly
in view of Germany’s attitude toward the Versailles Treaty,,
In such a circumstance, Switzerland’s ability to defend its
territory and prevent a French march through the country
into southern Germany was unquestionably an asset to Ger
many o
In July 1933, Mueller received notice from a ”western source of information that had been reliable for many
years,” that the French General Staff had made definite
plans for reoccupation of the Rhineland in the event of
12
German rearmament„

Taking this information into account,

he recommended that Germany observe the greatest circum
spection in its treatment of Switzerland, compelling propa
ganda in Switzerland to be as inconspicuous as possible„
Mueller undoubtedly hoped to use the alleged threat of
French intervention to curb Nazi propaganda and its adverse
effect on the Swisso

As usual his recommendations were

ignored, and the Foreign Organization continued its agi
tation o
A month later, Mueller analyzed the political
atmosphere in Switzerland as still favorable to Germany,
11DGFP, C 0 I, 6S0o
12Ibido, 6Slo

26

but noted that the Nazi organizations, in understandable
zeal for publicizing their ideology, were making too much
noiseo

He further cautioned that any sort of cooperation

with the leadership of the Swiss pro-Nazi fronts would be
13
detrimental to German-Swiss relations0

By August, it

was already obvious to many observers that Nazi propaganda
was not having the desired effect, for a decline in Nazism
in Switzerland was discernableo

Now there were meetings

at which large crowds declared their attachment to Swiss
democratic ideals and to the Swiss army0

On the other

handj meetings of the Swiss ’’grey shirts/’ the local Nazi
sympathizers, were still numerous and well-attended, but
failed to raise the same interest or attract the same
audiences as before<>

The decline in Nazism can be attri

buted to psychological errors in Nazi propaganda which
resulted in a patriotic revival among the Swiss
Such propaganda did have one positiye effect;,
since it prompted the Swiss to accelerate rearmament for
defense of their neutrality0

On October 12, 1933 > the

Federal Assembly voted to appropriate 20,000,000 Swiss
15
francs to replenish arms and military equipment0

In

the course of the debate on the defense bill, Minger stated
13DGFP s C, I, 664-65 *
14New York Times, 0cto 12, 1933, 1.
33Ibido„ Augo 2 9 9 1933? 1°
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that a German plan|for the invasion of Switzerland existed,
explaining that it was the type of plan that all general
staffs drafted, bat what was disquieting about it was the
small importance attached to the Swiss army and its power
of resistanceo

16

Minger did not mention his source for the

alleged invasion, and Germany denied the existence of
such a plan<>

Whether true or not, Minger?s statement, when

coupled with the threats inherent in Nazi propaganda,
had the desired effect on the Assembly,,

17

With the ini

tiation of a program for modernization of its armed forces,
Switzerland took the first steps toward implementing a
policy of active, or armed neutrality, and declared itself
ready to resist any aggression by force of arms0
Swiss public opinion, as well as the opinion of
government leaders, had turned strongly against Germany
in the months prior to the debate on the rearmament billo
Further, a series of violations of the Swiss frontier by
■^The. .appropriation of 20,000,000 francs was only
the first portion of a 120,000,000 franc request,, Since
192$ when only 750,000 francs were expended on defense,
the military budget had steadily increased,, By 1937 de
fense appropriations had reached 235»000,000 francs
($£0 ,000,000),,
17

It was in the interest of France to play upon
the Swiss fear, of a German invasion, and the French press
frequently carried reports of such German plans» The
"Auger" Articles, written by "Auger/' Vladimir Poliakov,
and carried by Le Petit. Parisien on September 24 and Octo
ber 8 reported that a German invasion of Switzerland was
imminent„ The "Auger" Articles were introduced into the
debate to arouse and intensify the fear of Germany which
was prevalent among some Swiss officials0
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Nazi agents increased Swiss hostility toward Germanyo

A

violation at O.tterbach was under investigation in late
September .1933, after Switzerland had protested the violationQ

Weizsaeker assured Federal Councillor Motta that

if the Germans concerned were guilty they would be punished„
A month earlier, the Swiss Minister to Berlin had protested
a violation of the frontier near Ramsen where German police
officers reportedly arrested a Czech citizen and dragged

19
him bodily across the frontier into Germany0

Party

functionaries carried on their activities among Germans in
Switzerland by attacking old German societies and individual
Germans, and generally distinguishing themselves by their
presumptiono

To come into conflict with Swiss authorities

was a proof of courage for them0

Anyone who was deported

from Switzerland could expect to be rewarded on his arrival

.

m

P
20
Germany„
Germanyfs banning of three Swiss newspapers, the

Neue Zuercher Zeltung, the Zuercher Volkzeitung a and the
Basler Nachrichten added to.the hostile feeling in Switzer
land 0

The Swiss government, as well as the German Foreign

1^DGFP, C, I, 843-44°
Giuseppe Motta (1870-1940).
Chief of the Swiss Political Department (Foreign Ministry),
1920-1940; President of the Swiss Confederation, 1915? 1920,
1932 and 19370
~^% e w York Times, Aug0 29, 1933 ,
^ E r n s t von Weizsaeker, The Memoirs of Ernst von
Weizsaeker (London, 1951), 90o '/Hereiafter cited as Weizsaeker, Memoirs 77
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Office, were anxious to dispel Swiss fears and restore
friendly relations.,.

Foreign Minister Motta, hoping to

secure an official German declaration of respect for Swiss
neutrality, used the Geneva Disarmament Conference in
September as an opportunity to explain Switzerland’s posi
tion to the German delegateso

Germany, too, was concerned

about the anti-German feeling in Switzerland, particularly
since Swiss rearmament appeared to be directed solely
against Germany0

Meeting with the German Foreign Minis-

ter, Konstantin von Neurath,
ganda, Joseph Goebbels,

22

21

.and the Minister of Propa-

he emphasized the anxiety that

reigned in..Switzerland regarding alleged Nazi ambitions
in Switzerlando.

The German Ministers categorically told

Motta that, such fears were absurd0

In Germany, "no rea

sonable person thought of. endangering the existence of the
Swiss Confederation0"

23

Neurath explained that Germany

was not in a position to make an official declaration of
respect for Swiss neutrality since a declaration of respect
^Konstantin Freiherr von Neurath (1B73-1956),
served as German Ambassador to London prior to his accep
tance of the Foreign Ministry in von Papen’s "Cabinet of
Barons" in 1932 „ In 193$ Hitler retired him in favor of
Joachim von Ribbentrop0 As a reward for his service,
Neurath was appointed President of the newly created Cabi
net Council, a body which was to advise the Fuehrer on
foreign affairs, but never me t 0
09

D r c. Joseph Goebbels (1S97~1945)? Reich Minister
of Propaganda and Public Enlightenment, 1933“1945o
23DGFP, C, I, $43“4 4 0
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for Swiss neutrality would have made similar declarations
to all neutrals necessary„

Consequently, no official

steps were taken by either government to calm the situa
tion, although Motta was encouraged by Neurathvs state
ment o
By the end of 1933? Germany’s policy in Switzerland
had had very limited success„

The pro-Nazi fronts had

lost some of their initial supporters, while the Swiss
had experienced a patriotic revival and were becoming
increasingly anti-German0

Nazi propaganda was alienating

the Swiss rather than converting them0

Weizsaeker noted

that, for the time being, the over-all balance in Switzer
land was negative, and he re-emphasized the fact that the
2L
Swiss were not impressed with the usual Nazi propaganda.,
Any German success in Switzerland would be prevented as
long as the Swiss feared loss of their independence to
Germanyo
On January 30, 1934? Hitler himself increased the
anxiety in Switzerland, when in a speech to the Reichstag,
he stated s
„ „ o it is self-evident that an aggressive intent
which has gripped and stirred to its depths the
whole German nation will not halt at the frontier
posts of a land which is German, not only in its
people, but in history as well, and which for many
centuries was an integral part of the German Empire0

24DGFP9
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Hitler was referring specifically to Austria, but the
Swiss were fully aware that Switzerland fell into the
same categoryo

Nazi propaganda had emphasized the fact

during; ..the past year0
In the same months, a Swiss fugitive from justice,
Erich Maey, was given command of a Berlin Storm Troop
detachment composed of Swiss citizens living in Germany
who declared themselves dedicated "to clean up the Swiss
pig sty0"

In response, the Swiss press intensified its

attacks on National Socialism and German officials,.

Finally,

on March 27, 1934, the. Swiss Federal Council passed an
ordinance which authorized the..-government to ban Swiss papers
if their attitude disturbed relations with a foreign powero
The ban, however, was not enforced„

To ban a Swiss paper

would have made the banning of German papers a necessity,
a step which the government hoped to avoid0
The Reich resorted to a pre-censorship of Swiss
papers in order to force the Swiss press to moderate its
comments ,on Germany„

From time to time,, the Basler Naeh-

richten was confiscated and the National-Zeitung subjected
to a pre-censorship by the Gestapo0

German authorities

failed to announce the reasons for the bans and confisca
tions, and consequently .their action seemed to be arbitrary
Johnson, "Switzerland is Next," 529°
27DGFP, C, II, 87 2 o
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and haphazard acts of police authority0

An attack on the

Swiss press by Per Angriff, a semi-official paper edited
by Go.eb.bels, brought a strong reaction from the Swiss0
Public opinion gradually forced the government to adopt
reprisalso

On July 6, Switzerland banned Per Angriff,

the Berliner Boersen-Zeitung» and the Voelkischer Beobachter
as counter measures to the discrimination against Swiss
papers in Germany»

Two days later, Germany retaliated by

banning the Neue Zuercher Zeitung, Per Bund, and the Basler
National-Zeitungo

With the reciprocal bans in effect, the

press war subsided for the next five months0
In the meantime, debate on Swiss rearmament proceeded0
Germany observed with appreciation the continued rearma
ment of the Swiss military, whose determination to defend
Swiss neutrality met with popular approval of all Swiss
partieso

Even the Social Bemocrats set aside their paci

fist line to -support Minger fs defense billo

Tentative

plans called for lengthening the term of military service,
construction of frontier fortifications, and expansibn of
the air force.

Even with these measures, Switzerland could

not reach a strength that would enable the state to defend
its frontiers without the help of a third party„
Swiss defensive plans were made regardless of which
frontier appeared to be threatened at the moment„

Army

maneuvers were not directed at any one side, and the forti
fications were to be constructed in small numbers and

33

spread over all exposed parts of the frontier,,

In 1934,

the Swiss gave proof of their intention to remain neutral
and defend their territorial integrity during the crisis
in Austria,,
When civil war erupted between the supporters of
Chancellor Dollfuss and the Austrian Socialists, the question
of foreign intervention arose„

Such a possibility was

dispelled on February 21, when the Federal Council announced
29
that Switzerland refused transit to any foreign troops0
In July, a Putsch carried out by Austrian Nazis led to the
assassination of Dollfuss„

In this instance, Swiss neutral”

ity proved to be an asset to Germany since the possibility
of intervention was raised in France„

Switzerland discour

aged active intervention by refusing to allow any foreign
military force pass through Switzerland,,

In November 1934

Weizsaeker noted:
Thus, far the Swiss concept of neutrality is quite
clearo „ „ „ It also fits completely with Germany5s
interestso
As matters stand today, we can not wish
for anything better on our southern frontier between
La-ke Constance and Basel than a firm buttress and a
guarantee against surprises„3Q
Although Switzerland would ostensibly defend its
frontiers against any aggressor, including France, Geirmany
was well aware that the Swiss had departed from neutrality
2SDGFP, C, III, 144o
29Ibida, 5 & U
3 °Ibido, $72-73 o
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as far as their sympathies were concerned„

Obviously, with

this condition prevalent, Switzerland would be likely to
place the blame on Germany should a European crisis develop»
Germanyfs task in Switzerland was to modify the condition
by adapting its propaganda to win over Swiss sympathy0
By December 1934 the Swiss press had toned down
its anti-German attitude0

With the bans on the papers due

to expire on January 10, 1935, three days before the Saar
plebescite, the Foreign Ministry and the German Legation
in Berne suggested that the bans not be renewed, since it
was hoped that the plebescite would be favorably reported
in the Swiss press„

Hitler, however, ’’doubted the wisdom”

of lifting the bans, since Switzerland had not completely
abandoned its attacks on National Socialism,,

31

On January 1, 1935, Motta®s Deputy approached
Bernhard von Buelow3^ on the subject of an official German
declaration of respect for Swiss neutrality»

Buelow re

plied that it would be difficult to find any authoritative
quarter in Germany which would be prepared to make such a
statemento

"They would not run the risk of making them

selves look ridiculous, as no serious person in Germany
was thinking of interfering.with the integrity of Switzerland in any w a y 0”

33

On the following day, Buelow again

31DGFP, C, III, 732o
3^B@rnhard von Buelow (1&&5-1939), State Secretary
in the German Foreign Ministry„
33DGFP, C, III, £90-91o'
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rejected a similar request, pointing out that such a dec
laration. to Switzerland would be followed by requests, by
other countries, "so that Germany should eventually be in
the awkward and ridiculous position of having to give
assurances to all sides that we are not robbers at heart
and were not lying, in wait for our neighbors0"

For the

time being Germany saw no reason to issue a declaration
of respect for Swiss neutrality..

As far as the foreign

Ministry was concerned, there were no definite plans
regarding Switzerland fs possible incorporation in the
Reich.,

The Swiss state was more valuable to Germany as

a neutral buffer against France on the southern frontier
of the Reich0
In March, the tension in Switzerland was increased
when German agents in.,_Kl@inbasel kidnapped Berthold Jacob,
a German emigre, working against the Nazi regimeo

German

authorities refused to admit the fact and refused to re
lease Jacob.*

Swiss sovereignty had again ve.en violated,

and Weizsaeker was left with the difficult task of exerting
a calming influence in Berne until he succeeded in over35

coming the obstinancy of German official quarters*

The

Swiss government protested the incident vigorously and
and invoked the German-Swiss Arbitration Treaty of 1921o
34 d g f p ,
35
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Forseeing the probable verdict of a court of arbitration,
Weizsaeker finally convinced Berlin of the futility of
holding Jacobo

On September 9? Hitler ordered the victimJs

release; he was handed over to Swiss authorities a week
later
As a result of this last violation of Swiss sovereignty, the Federal Council took up the question of
dissolving all Kfazi organizations in Switzerland,,

In

an attempt to repair the damage done by the 11Jacob case/'
Hitler in a speech on May 21 emphasized Germany l!s intention
to pursue a policy of peace and friendship with its neigh
bors, stating tftat:
The German Reich— and in particular the present
German Government— have no other wish than to live
on friendly and peaceful terms with all neighboring
Stateso We entertain these feelings not only toward
‘
> but also toward the neighboring
The Fuehrer made special reference to the relations be
tween the Reich and Switzerland;
I myself believe that no regime which does not
rest on public consent and is not supported by the
people can continue permanently,. If there are no
such difficulties between Germany and Switzerland,
which is to a large extent German, that is due to
the fact that the independence and self-reliance of
Switzerland is a reality, and because nobody doubts
that the Swiss Government represents the real and
^ A d o l f Hitler, My New Order„ ed„ de Sales (NoT„,
1941), 322„ /Hereafter cited as Hitler, My New OrderT’
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legal expression of the will of the people0
Foreign Minister.Motta was impressed by Hitler’s
"deep and sincere desire for peace which made itself felt
throughout the speech" and expressed his pleasure at the
recognition of the independence and autonomy of the Confederation,,

3B

For the present at least, Hitler was con

tent to allow the Swiss Confederation to continue its
independent existence on the Reich’s southern frontier,,
By assuring the Swiss of his respect for their independence,
Hitler successfully calmed public opinion and prevented
temporarily the dissolution of National Socialist groups
in Switzerland0
The calming effect of the May 21 speech was short
lived o

Germany revived the press war by imposing a new

ban on the Basler Nachrichten„ alleging that the paper
had been publishing anti-German articles„

Switzerland

retaliated by imposing bans on Per Relchsdeutsche, the
organ of Germans in Switzerland, Per Stuermer and Per
Alemanne o

Berlin continually cited the anti-German Swiss

as the basic cause.of trouble between the states0

Switzer

land for its part hesitated to place any restrictions on
its own press s particularly after it was banned throughout
Germanyo
•^Hitler, My New Order, 326-2?o
3 ^PGFP, C, III, 239“4 0 o
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The Swiss Government honestly tried to maintain
its policy of neutrality but could do nothing to correct
the attitude of the public <,
right to be critical„

"The Swiss papers had every

Their readers demanded that they

should express a definite point of view in regard to the
Third Eeicho
negativeo
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In a sound democracy this could only be
Hitler and his advisers were not inclined to

take advice from abroad and reacted to it with frontier
incidents or other criminal aets0

The diplomatic reports

from Berne were not believed in Berlin, since local and
regional-representatives of the party in Switzerland rose
above the diplomatic personnel in importance0

As a whole,

these officials had been recruited from the ranks of those
who had been failures in their professions and who now thought
that their time had come„

"As in every revolution, the

social misfits, tub-thumpers, and informers came to the
40
surface0"
The role of the German Minister to Switzer
land was not a dynamic one;

it was his function to act

as a brake o4"*"
Swiss public opinion held that foreigners living
in Switzerland had diplomatic and consular representatives
for their protectiono

Dual state controls, such as the

39
Weizsaeker, Memoirs 9 96 c.
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Nazi regime had established in Germany, could not be toler
ated in Switzerland because the unofficial representatives
of the party in power created only confusion and trouble„
In the fall of 1935» the Swiss left-wing press
initiated a campaign to bring about the expulsion of Wil
helm G u s t l o f f t h e Landesgruppenleiter^
Organization in Switzerland0

of the Foreign

Gustloff had angered Swiss

socialists by organizing Germans in Switzerland in support
of Hitlero

On February 4i> 1936, David Frankfurter, a

Jugoslav medical student in Berne, assassinated Gustloff
in his home in Davos0

The assassin declared to the can

tonal police that he was a Jew and wished to avenge the
persecution of Jews in Germany
Reaction in Germany created a sensation which
crowded all other events into the background,,

Hitler

immediately sent the following telegram to Gustloff?s
widow”
In the heavy loss you have suffered I express
to you in the name of the whole German people my
sincerest sympathy0 The nefarious crime that put
an end to a truly German man has created deep
^ T h e Landesgruppenleiter were the regional leaders
of the Nazi Party organizations abroad„ Gustloff generally
coordinated the activity of the Party in Switzerland„ To
assist him, Gustloff relied upon Party leaders in each can
ton, known as Kreisleiter0 Gustloff himself was a fanatic
follower of Hitler, adoring the Fuehrer to the point of
idolatryo
According to Weizsaeker, he often gazed at the
Fuehrer?s picture for hours "to gain strength,," Weizsae
ker, Memoirs» 94°
^ New York Times, Feb„ 5j 1936, 1„
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emotion and resentment in the entire nation,,^
Morning papers in Germany carried the story in banner headlineSo

The Voelkischer Beobachter used the assassination

for an attack on Judaism, stating that the assassination
provided justification for National Socialism’s stand on
u
the Jewish question0
Weizsaeker called on Motta and demanded a strict
investigation of the. assassination„

He emphasized the

complicity of the Swiss press in inciting the assassin,
pointing out that he could not recall a conversation with
Motta in the past two years in which he did not have to
strongly protest the Swiss press0

The German Minister

explicitly stated that the press campaign had not only
represented the murdered man as the embodiment of National
Socialist disruption in Switzerland and had consistently
demanded his expulsion, but had also, at least covertly,
4b
encouraged violence against him0

The Propaganda Minis

try instructed the German press to emphasize t h e .point that
Frankfurter did not commit an act of revenge, did not know
the victim, and had arrived from Jugoslavia three years
earlier from whence he had derived no motive for the a c t o ^
44New York Times, Feb0 5 $ 1936, l c
45Ibido
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The motivation for the crime had come from the Swiss press
and Frankfurter?s exposure to the campaign against Gust
loff o
The assassination provided Germany with a new mar
tyr for National Socialism as well as an opportunity to
exact concessions from the Swiss government in the form
of restrictions on the Swiss press o

German authorities

continued to emphasize the complicity of the Swiss press
as the sole cause of the crime, confident that the Federal
Council would finally take steps to tone down the press <,
Unfortunately for Nazi propagandists, the forth
coming Olympics which were to be held in Germany, made it
necessary to avoid anti-Jewish excesses for a time*

Ger

many intended to present its more civilized side to the
nations of the world, so the Frankfurter trial was not
allowed to develop.'into a " Jewish Monster Trial."

The

Voelkischer Beobachter » most vitriolic of the German pa
pers called for the death penalty for Frankfurter, but
this too was a v o i d e d T h e

Swiss Constitution excluded

the death penalty for political crimes, and the Canton of
Grisons, in which the crime was committed, had abolished
capital punishment, years before.

Ultimately, Germany’s

only policy was to press for restraint of the Swiss press,
hoping to remove or at least moderate a major source of
^ N e w York T i m e s , Feb. 7 , 1 9 3 6 , 1 3 o
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criticism.of the Third Reicho
Swiss reaction to the assassination came as a com
plete surprise to Germany„

On February £, 1936, the Fed

eral Council ordered the suppression of all cantonal
(Kreisleitungen) and regional (Landesleitung) Nazi organi
zations in Switzerlando
As usual, the Voelkischer Beobachter led the pro
test and called for reciprocal action against Swiss citizens
in Germanyo

49

Neurath immediately protested the ban ,

stressing that Switzerland had subjected the NSDAP. to an
exceptional law which was not compatible with the general
law relating to aliens and that the resolution plainly dis
played an inner and direct connection with the murder of the
50
Landesgruppenleiter„
Under these circumstances, the
German Government expected the Swiss to rescind the pro
hibition of February

Switzerland refused, and officially

all National Socialist organizations in Switzerland weredissolved, leaving the Nazi Party without representation
in Switzerland„

To compensate for the loss of the Landes-

gruppenleiter, Germany transferred the work of that de
partment to the Legation in Berne and appointed a new
member to the Legation to carry on Gustloff9s duties0
The assassination and its consequences made necessary
^ % e w York Times, Feb« 19> 1936, 13°
5°DGFP, C, IV, 1153=56, passim.
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a new evaluation of the position of Germans in Switzer
land „

Weizsaeker noted that a very large number of Reichs-

deutsche

(German citizens in Switzerland) still displayed

a temporizing or even negative attitude toward the Reich,,
This did not imply that all previous propaganda had been
in vain, but rather that rapid progress was not to be
expected because of the Swiss fear of National Socialism0
He reiterated his earlier program for successful work in
Switzerland , which had been set forth in 1933°

If the fear

of Germany 's annexing a part of Switzerland were reduced,
successful work among the German-speaking Swiss would
increaseo ^
Germany's denunciation of the Locarno Pact on
March 7, 1936 produced no major reaction among the Swiss0
Motta j with whom Weizsaeker discussed the. German plan for
reoccupation of the Rhineland, described the step as a
’’dangerous gamble0n
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The Swiss Foreign Office viewed

the situation calmly, showing understanding for Germany's
positionj and on March. 10, affirmed that Switzerland was
not obliged to take part in sanctions imposed on a viola
tor of the Locarno Pact*.

After the reoccupation of the

Rhineland, Switzerland stepped up work on its national
defenses,,

Previously, Germany had erected new defensive

51DGFP, C, IV, 1195“ 96o
52Ibid, C, V, 54°
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installations on its side of the Swiss frontiero

In an

interview with Defense Minister Minger, Weizsaeker praised
the Swiss determination to defend its neutrality and dis
counted a critical article in the Boersen-Zeitung as not
taking exception to Swiss rearmament but only to its ap
parent one-sidedness „

Minger pointed out that it was

Switzerland’s duty to safeguard its frontier so as to make
an advance into Switzerland not worth the risk for either
France or Germanyo

The new German installations in South

Baden and in the Black.Forest had caused concern in Swit
zerland o

Weizsaeker discounted the rumor of alleged German

designs on Switzerland and assured Minger that Switzerland
had nothing to fear from Germany0
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Although Hitler had no designs on Switzerland while
Weizsaeker served as Minister to Switzerland s an official
declaration of respect for Swiss neutrality had become
necessary•

Certain party leaders had had a markedly dis

turbing effect on German-Swiss relations„

Strong language

by Goering^ such as "The Swiss have muck in their heads/'
and threatening speeches directed across the Rhine by the
Gauleiter of Baden? as well as the attitude of some South
German newspapers 9 kept alive the Swiss fear of annexation,,
53 D G F P ,
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On January 30, 1937? Hitler, in a speech to the
Reichstag, referred to the German guarantees to Belgium
and Holland, renewing his pledge nfo recognize and guarantee
these States as untouchable and neutral regions for all
56
timeo”
The Fuehrer made no mention whatsoever of Swit
zerland o

The omission caused immediate concern in Swit

zerland where the people regarded Swiss neutrality as
the model for all neutral states„

Hitler9s failure to

guarantee Swiss neutrality led to a visit by ex-President
Schulthess to Berlin, where he was received by Hitler0
!

The Fuehrer expressed his belief that Switzerland was
a European necessity and that the Reich desired to have
the best relations with the Swiss<,
affirmed.;

In closing, Hitler

"Through all time and whatever happens, we

will respect Switzerland’s neutrality and integrity.
affirm it categorically„

I

Never have I given occasion
57

for a contrary opiniono"

The Federal Council took note

of the statement with satisfaction, hoping that the Reich
would live up to the promise.

Hitler’s declaration coin

cided with a declaration by Mussolini that Italy had stopped
all irredentist propaganda in Italian Switzerland follow
ing Swiss recognition of his. Ethiopian conquest0
Hitler’s statement to Schulthess was the first
56

Hitler, My New Order, 410.

57New York Times, Feb. 27, 1937,
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official attempt by Berlin to follow the policy advocated
by the German Legation in Berne0

The statement succeeded

in improving relations between the two states, but Nazi
agitation and propaganda directed toward Switzerland did
not stop, and the Swiss continued to display a strong
anti-German attitude in their press0
Hitler apparently agreed with Weizsaekerfs belief
that Swiss neutrality was in Germany?s interest since a
neutral Switzerland provided a ’’firm buttress and guaran
tee. against surprises” on the southern frontier of the
Reich,

On March 10, 1937, Hitler expressed his approval

of Swiss neutrality to Weizsaeker,

Switzerland in the

south and Belgium in the north were to be pivots, and
between them Hitler intended to fortify the frontier very
strongly,

”That would. Hitler observed, ”be the best

thing for u s 0” ^
In November 1937, the pro-German circles in Swit
zerland momentarily set aside their Pan-German agitation
and resorted to legal means to secure their objectives.
According to the Easier Nachrichten« the pro-Nazi circles
hoped to place a proposal before the Swiss electorate
which would repudiate the London Declaration of 1920 and
force the Swiss to readopt their traditional, prewar policy
of absolute neutrality.
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Although unsuccessful, the

5g
Weizsaeker, Memoirs«, 113o
5%few York Times, Nov, 11, 1937, 10„
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German attempt to use legal channels indicated a change
in Nazi policy <>

An attempt had been made earlier to bring

the states closer together through a proposed conference
between representatives of the German and Swiss press0
However, the success of the conferences was blocked by a
speech at Nuremberg, in which the German press chiefs
Dr« Dietrich, attacked Swiss independence,,

Switzerland

consequently shelved the proposed conference„
By February 1938? it was again necessary for Hitler
to reassure the Swiss that they were not an object of the

60

Reich’s racial policy0

Hitler’s reassurance helped to

mollify the hostile feeling created by Dietrich’s Nuremberg
speech and calm the situation in Switzerland in prepara
tion for Germany’s Anschluss with Austria0
On March 14 $ after the German army had moved into
Austria, the German Minister to Berne called on Motta to
assure him, in the name of Hitler, that Germany had no
evil intentions in regard to Switzerland and that the
Fuehrer would respect the integrity of the country*,^

A

day earlier, the Swiss had reinforced customs guards along
the Austrian frontier, explaining that the precautions taken
were meant to deal with the possibility of an influx of
60DGFP, D , V , 674o
^ R o A „ Friedman, "Switzerland Fights Against a
New Anschluss," Contemporary Review, CLIV (1938), 312.
/Hereafter cited as Friedman, "New Anschluss017
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refugeeso

The Swiss government took a grave view of the

Anschluss, partly because of Hitler’s methods and partly
because of what these methods and Hitler’s program for
unifying the whole German race implied for Switzerland,^
On March 15, Weizsaeker again stressed Hitler’s pledge
to Switzerland in an attempt to counter the Swiss press
which drew a lesson from Austria’s fate,

The annexation

of Austria led the Swiss army to speed up the completion
of its defenses all along its borders with the Reich,
During the crisis, bridges across the Rhine and roads
leading to the frontiers were mined, but this was the extent
of Swiss action at the time.
In regard to the Anschluss, the Swiss Minister to
Berlin, Hans Froelicher,

expressed the opinion that

Switzerland was naturally interested in having Austria
remain a buffer between Germany and Italy,

On the other

hand, the internal stability of its neighbors was equally
Important to Switzerland, and the Swiss were not blind
to the fact that Austria was unable to bring about domestic
conciliation on its o w n , ^

The Swiss Government did not

take a strong stand against Germany’s action in Austria,
even though it implied a similar fate for the Swiss,
62New York Times, March 13, 1933, 3o
63

Hans Froelicher, Swiss Minister to Berlin* 1933-

1945 c
64DGFP, D, V, 674o
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After the Anschluss, Germany reopened its press
campaign against Switzerland0

Vienna bookshops displayed

maps of the new Reich including Austria and the territories
outside the Reich?s frontiers considered to belong to the
"fatherland <>"

Among the territories were included the

German-speaking portions of S w i t z e r l a n d T h e Frank
furter Zeitung published an article which stated;

"No

branch of the German race has the right of the possibility
of withdrawing -from the common destiny of all the Germans
In the same vein, the Deutsche Bergwekzeitung wrote that
Austria had "had the experience called Verschweizern
(Swissing), meaning the tragedy of a people which has been
made to believe that they were a nation while in reality
they were only part of a community of the same language0"

6?

Both statements gave notice that Switzerland could not
expect to continue its independent existence outside of
the Reicho

Ultimately the Swiss Government lodged a pro

test in Berlin against the agitation which marked German
speaking regions of Switzerland as future German territory0
While the German press carried on its Pan-German
demands, the German Minister in Berne pressured Foreign
Minister Motta to exercise more control over the attitude
^ R . A o Friedman, "New Anschluss," 313<>
66Ibido
67Ibido
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of the Swiss press0

The Swiss Publishers 8 Association

had already in January 193& cautioned the press to exer
cise restraint in questions of foreign policy<>

But no

official pressure was exerted to restrain the press, and
the Publishers’ Association’s cautioning was not taken
seriously by many papers,,
Hitler’s success in Austria completed the destruc
tion of Switzerland’s faith in the League of Nations and
convinced the Swiss that their only hope of escaping in
volvement in hostilities was to revert to the traditional
policy of absolute neutrality„

On May 14* 193&* the League

accepted the Swiss decision and agreed that Switzerland,
while still remaining a member of the League, would not
be called upon to join in the enforcement of economic
sanctionso
Minister Denichert presented the new German Foreign Minister, Joachim von Ribbentrop,

with a note on

Swiss neutrality informing him of Switzerland’s decision,,
Ribbentrop expressed no enthusiasm for Switzerland’s re
turn to absolute neutrality and referred to the "possible
untoward consequences in wartime of Swiss hospitality
to the L e a g u e H e

also criticized the still objectionable

6g
Joachim von Ribbentrop (l$93-1947)* succeeded
Neurath as Foreign Minister in 193
Previously he had
served as Ambassador to London and with his "Bureau Rib
bentrop" dabbled in Foreign Policy,,
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character of the Swiss p r e s s G e r m a n y intended to with
hold a declaration of respect for Switzerland’s new status
until concessions were made concerning the anti-German
Swiss press and the position of the Nazi organizations in
Switzerland which had been banned in 1936c

The Swiss

retreat to absolute neutrality was a victory for German
policy, but the problem of the League’s location in Geneva
still remainedo
Not until June 14 did Hitler again express his
determination to respect Swiss neutrality "in all circum
stances

promising that the policy would not be changed

in the future,

70

Mussolini simultaneously notified the

Swiss government of Italy’s intention to respect Swiss
neutrality.

The joint declarations, for which the Swiss

government expressed "very great satisfaction and gratitude/’
led to a brief period of improved relations between Germany
and Switzerland,
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But as the autumn of 193$ approached,

Germany began to intensify its press campaign against Swit
zerland,

However, the agitation in the Nazi press differed

from the previous propaganda,

Germany now made an effort

to force Switzerland to adhere tightly to its policy of
absolute neutrality.

The Nationalsozialistische Monatshefte

attempted to extend the concept of neutrality beyond the
69
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acts and pledges of the government to cover even the atti72
tude of individuals and private institutions0'

Switzer

land was led to believe that if it did not follow this
policy of neutrality Germany might disregard its assurances
to Switzerlando
Militarily* Switzerland regained its importance
as a buffer between France and southern Germany,,

In the

event that France attempted any intervention against the
Reich, a neutral Switzerland prepared to defend its neu
trality against the French would be a definite asset to
the Reich,

Germany relied heavily on the belief that France

would respect Swiss neutrality,

Therefore Hitler was rea

sonably sure that French intervention, if any, would come
somewhere along the French-German frontier, and necessary
German forces could be concentrated in that area.
On September 13, 193$, the Swiss Government again
ordered mines placed under all bridges and tunnels near
the frontiers as "preventive measures0n
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Two weeks later,

in order to further emphasize Its intention to maintain
absolute neutrality, Switzerland addressed a note to Hitler
resolving to remain outside any conflicts and not to engage
in controversial questions, or even express an opinion on
7^Arnold Toynbee and Veronica Toynbee, Survey of
International Affairs, 1939-1946;
The War and the Neutrals
(London, 1956), 205,
/Hereafter cited as Toynbee", War and~
the Neutrals o7
73New York Times, Sept„-13, 193$, 14<>
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the procedure that might solve such questions
During the Munich crisis, Switzerland hesitated
until the last moment to undertake measures for mobiliza
tion and in the end avoided mobilization completely.,

The

Swiss Government intended to maintain strict neutrality,
although public opinion strongly protested the German
action in Czechoslovakia„

During the crisis, life became

strenuous for Germans in Switzerland„

Tradespeople were

subject to a boycott, and numerous insults against Germans
took placeo

Germany considered similar measures against

Swiss citizens in Germany but dropped the idea since counter
measures would have increased the difficulties of Germans
in Switzerlando

The Swiss press carried its attack on the

Munich settlement so far as to attack Daladier and Chamberlain for their participation in the dismemberment of the
Gzech state,,
Germany®s success at Munich caused Switzerland to
revise its attitude toward France„

Some circles among the

Swiss began to wonder about the effectiveness of the French
military, particularly since Switzerland counted on French
assistance in the event of a German attack on, or invasion
through, Switzerlando
Swiss agitation against Germans reached its high
point in November 193$°

The Berne newspaper, Per Bund„

?^New York Times, Sept„ 30, 193$ s 6„

published a letter, allegedly addressed by a German lawyer
to a client in Switzerland, referring to the ”future Reich
Governor of Berne0T,^5

Demonstrations against Germans in

Berne followed, and the boycott against merchants continued„
Ultimately, an investigation of the letter by the Swiss
<>

Government found it to be a forgery.,

The announcement of

this fact served to calm public opinion in Switzerland.,
To pacify Germany, the Swiss Minister to Berlin, in an
address to the Swiss residents of Munich, spoke favorably
of the Munich Agreement and recognized the right of selfdetermination of peoples07^

Switzerland essentially took

the lead in restoring the relations which had been disrupted
by the forged letter and the consequences of its publication
Germany further warned the Swiss that if they intended to
be regarded as a neutral power, the anti-German agitation
in the Swiss press must come to a halto
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By the end of 193&? German pressure on the Swiss
Government had successfully forced the Swiss to rely upon
armed neutrality as the best possible means to avoid involve
ment in any conflict0

During 1939? Hitler was determined

to see that Switzerland adhered to this policy and if neces
sary would defend its frontiers against a possible threat
75dgfp, d,v, 7010
76Ibid0 . 702o
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from France 0
The Franco-British ”Gentleman’s Agreement,” when
announced in the press on March 27, 1939, brought immediate
reaction from Berlin„

By the terms of the Agreement, France

and Great Britain agreed to recognize a violation of Swiss,
Dutch, or Belgian neutrality as a casus b e l l i Weizsaeker
demanded an immediate elucidation of the extent of Swiss
participation in the affair0

Switzerland, in fact, had

had no knowledge of the Agreement until March 21, when the
French informed the Swiss Minister to Paris, whereupon the
Swiss merely took note of the Agreement while emphasizing
that it remained for Switzerland to decide when interven
tion was necessary,79

Germany interpreted the Swiss answer

as a formal acceptance of the guarantee and charged that
the Swiss were following a one-sided policy incompatible
with neutrality„

The controversy continued until July 20,

when under German pressure, Switzerland issued a note on
its neutrality stating that Switzerland’s right to invoke
the help of other states in the event of a breach of neu
trality was uncontestedo

Such help could only be afforded

in response to Switzerland’s explicit request<>

Unsolicited

intervention of a third state had to be viewed as a violation of neutralityo

SO

The note did little to convince

7% r e a t Britain, Documents on British Foreign Policy,
1919-1939, Third Series, TTlLondonT"l949J'> 100-101»
79DGFP, D, VI, 2S6-2S7,
gQIbido, 949o

56

Berlin of Switzerland’s nonparticipation in the Agreement,,
German interests demanded that Switzerland remain neutral
in all respects, and the alleged Swiss participation in the
Franco-British guarantee was seen as a Swiss move into the
French orbit„
Germany continued to maintain pressure on Switzer
land until late August to insure that the Swiss would remain
neutral should the Reich become engaged in a conflict in the
Easto

On August 13, 1939, Foreign Minister Motta publicly

emphasized the importance of Switzerland’s "unfettered
neutrality" and restated the Swiss position that the FrancoBritish negotiations were conducted without Swiss knowledge0
Switzerland, as always, would rely upon its own military
forces for defense and would accept help only upon its
own requesto

Shortly after Motta?s speech, the matter

of the "Gentleman’s Agreement" was allowed to drop, and
Hitler once more declared his intention to respect Swiss
neutralityo
On August 25, Ribbentrop sent notes to the European
neutrals assuring them of Germany’s respect for their neu
trality and demanding in return that these states resist
attempts by third parties to infringe on their neutrality,,
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On the following day, Switzerland declared its intention to
eiDGFP, D, VI, 949°
82Ibid0, VII, 286-87o
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maintain the "strictest neutrality" in case of war „
In August and September 1939 , Switzerland took
measures to safeguard the country,,

Frontier forces were

called up, and the sales of food stuffs suspended?

A state

of active service was declared on August 29, and the Assem
bly elected a commander-in-chief for the Swiss army,,
General mobilization took place on September 2, and the usual
mining of bridges and tunnels was ordered0

Thus at the

time of the invasion of Poland, Switzerland had followed
the course of action which Germany had worked to insure
in its relations with Switzerland0
As further proof of its intention to remain neutral
in all respects, Switzerland, on Germany’s demand, requested
that the League session of November 10 be exclusively con
fined to discussion of the Russo-Finnish c o n f l i c t A f t e r
the fall of Poland, the Swiss had no choice but to defend
their neutrality, since only this policy offered the pos
sibility of escaping involvement in w a r 0

The failure of

France to aid the Poles further undermined Swiss faith
in France, although secret military talks continued with
the French General S t a f f o
Germany?s attitude toward Swiss neutrality over
the preceding seven years had been determined by a mixture
^3DGFP, D, VI, 312o
■^Ibid., VIII, 495-96«,
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of diplomacy and propaganda which inadvertently led Swit
zerland to adopt a course most favorable to the Reicho
Nazi propaganda, rather than converting the Swiss to National
Socialism, succeeded only in alienating them0

No Swiss

was anxious to see German-speaking Switzerland absorbed
in Hitler?s "greater Germany0"

German propaganda, which

continually emphasized this point, convinced the Swiss that
the Nazi regime represented a threat to Swiss independence <>
As a result, Switzerland emphasized its neutrality and
undertook a program of rearmament in order to be able to
defend its neutrality if necessary<,

In reality, a rearmed

and neutral Switzerland was in the political and military
interest of Germany and met with German approval, since,
in Weizsaeker ?s words, Germany could "wish for nothing
better on its southern frontier than a firm buttress and
guarantee against surprises0"
German success in Austria and Czechoslovakia under
mined Swiss faith in the League of Nations, and the Swiss
reverted to their traditional policy of absolute neutrality
in May 1 9 3 announcing their intention to defend the country
against all aggressors0

By the beginning of the war, the

Swiss were firmly entrenched in their policy of neutrality
and determined to prevent any violation of the Swiss fron
tier by force of arms0
The failure of Nazi propaganda offers an explanation
for the failure of the Reich to attempt an Anschluss with
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Switzerlando

Swiss Nazi organizations never achieved a

following similar to the Sudeten and Austrian Nazi Parties0
The stability of the Swiss state and the loyalty of the
Swiss to their established form of federal government pre
served Switzerland from the fate of newly created Austria
and Czechoslovakiao

The idea of an Anschluss9 however,

remained a hope of Nazi leaders throughout the war, but
conditions for a successful attempt failed to materialize0

CHAPTER III
SWITZERLAND IN -GERMAN STRATEGY, 1940-1943
After annexing the Saarland, Austria, the Sudetenland and Danzig, the Third Reich lacked only one region
in Europe with a sizable German-speaking population0

Swit

zerland alone retained its independence, but there was
no doubt in Berlin that sooner or later the "Suedmark"
would be incorporated into Hitler’s "greater Germanyo”
As in the prewar years, Nazi party members continually
talked of incorporating Switzerland, but such talk repre
sented only unofficial rumors which were utilized for their
psychological effects on the Swiss«

The threat of a German

invasion was sufficient to prevent Switzerland’s aligning
itself with Germany?s enemies„

Whether official plans for

such an event were ever drawn up by the Foreign Ministry
or by the Foreign Office is obscure„
Stuttgart, the nearest large German city to Swit
zerland was made the seat of various official and unofficial
German agencies assigned to operate in Switzerland-T-to
conduct propaganda, organize spying, and carry out acts of
sabotageA

small number of German nationals living in

Switzerland were organized into a section of the Nazi Party,

191°

■^David Jo Dallin, Soviet Espionage (New Haven, 1964)
/Hereafter cited as Dallin, Soviet Espionage^/7
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while Swiss nationals with National Socialist leanings were
united in the "National Front" and other such organizations,
all of them controlled and financed by Berlin,,
Of all the German-speaking countries and areas in
Europe, Switzerland was the least sympathetic toward Nazi
Germany, and the majority of Germans living in Switzerland
were especially antagonistic toward Nazism,,

Efforts in

northern Switzerland to build up a movement like the Henlein
movement of the Sudetenland were small and could be sup
pressed by the cantonal police when necessary0

This state

of public opinion was one of the reasons for Germany’s
decision not to invade Switzerland, and in the long run it
saved the country from occupation and devastation^
During the period of the "phoney war," Germany
gave no indication that a change in its attitude toward
Switzerland was imminent„

In an address to the Reichstag

on October 6, 1939, Hitler issued peace appeals to France
and Great Britain and reviewed Germany’s friendly relations
with the European neutrals over the past seven years0

In

reference to Switzerland, the Fuehrer observed:
o o o „ Germany adopted the same attitude toward
Switzerlando
The Reich Government has never given
the slightest cause for doubting their desires to
establish friendly relations with the country0
Moreover, they themselves have never brought forward
2Dallin, Soviet Espionage, 191-92,
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any complaint regarding the relations between the
two countries„3
The Reich?s new Minister to Switzerland, Dr« Otto
Koecher,^ met with President Henry Vallotton in February
of 1940 and assured him that it was ”urgently necessary”
for Germany to leave Switzerland out of the w

a

r

Since

the Minister ps statement was unauthorized, he requested
that Vallotton not repeat it to the Swiss press0

At the

same time, he tried to impress upon the President that it
was equally necessary for the Swiss press to adopt a new
attitude toward Nazi Germany
Strict control over the press was not yet imposed,
although some officials began to consider this policy
necessary to insure that the press would not provoke a
German attack on Switzerland0

The strongly anti-Nazi Swiss

press, as noted above, had been one of the main causes of
friction between Germany and Switzerland since 1933«

In

view of the fate of the Austrians, Czechs and Poles, restric
tion if not complete government censorship did not appear
to be an unreasonable policyo
Switzerland for its part continued to regard the
^Hitler, My. New Order, 742-43 0
^Dr0 Otto Koecher replaced Weizsaeker as Minister
to Berne and served in that capacity from 1937-1945<>
5DGFP, D, VIII, 772o
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maintenance of armed neutrality as the only means by which
the country could maintain its independence and escape in
volvement in the war„

The Swiss mobilization of September

1939 was not a strategic deployment of forces but merely
a measure to enable the army to combine in the north against
a German attack, or in the west in the event of a French
attack,,
Guisan,

The Commander of the Swiss Army, General Henri
7

believed that Hitler would not be content with

the acquisition of Poland and feared that Switzerland might
be Germany's next objective„

He therefore utilized the

period of the ”phoney warT? to prepare an operational plan
in case of a German attack across Switzerland's northern
si

frontiero
After his so-called T,peaee speech1’ of October 6
failed to elicit a favorable response from the British and
French, Hitler began to consider preparations for an attack
on Franceo

On October 22, he designated November 12 as the

date for the beginning of the western offensive„

However,

7

In Switzerland the position of Commander of the
Swiss Army is elective,, In peace time the Swiss Army, which
is a militia army, is commanded by men of the rank of Colo
nel o In the event of a war, the Swiss Federal Assembly
elects a commander of the Army, who is given the rank of
general for the duration of the crisis0 On September 29,
1939, the Assembly elected Henri Guisan, a well-to-do
farmer from French-speaking Switzerland to command its
army0 The ’’General,” as he was known, represented Switzer
land's will to resist and enjoyed immense popularity through
out the war„
B
General Henri Guisan, Bericht an die Bundesversammlung ueber den Aktivdienst ,” l939-1945*r~TZurich, 1946),
137 THereaf t er"cit ed~~as°~GuTsanT‘Beri cht<■7

64

unfavorable weather conditions forced postponement of the
November deadline , a process which was to be repeated fif
teen times before the end of 1939°
On January 1, 1940, Hitler was once again forced
to postpone the offensive0

On this date * an entry in the

journal of General Haider, Chief of Staff of the Army
(OKH or Oberkommando des Heeres),^ indicates that Hitler
was considering the possibility of undertaking an advance
into southern France0

General Haider noted the following

in his Journal;
Italy; Mussolini has sent word that he will approach
the Fuehrer with proposals by the middle of January„
Use of Italians in German operations in the West;
The
Fuehrer is thinking of independent missions; Southern
Frances through Savoy, to the southwest;
Even our
promise to Switzerland would be no real obstacle
Even before Germanyfs attack on Poland, Mussolini
had been forced to admit to Hitler that his army could not
be prepared for a European war before 1942 and could not
enter the war without extensive German supplies<,

In a

letter to Hitler in January 1940, Mussolini made no mention
9
^General Frans Haider succeeded General Ludwig Beck
as Chief of Staff in 193$ and served until September 1942,
when* because of numerous conflicts with Hitler, he was dis
missed o Haider came from a Catholic , Bavarian family with
a tradition of producing general staff officers„ Because
of his Catholicism and general staff outlook, he seldom got
along with Hitler, particularly during the Russian campaign,,
In 1944s he was arrested in connection with the events of
July 20 but not brought to trial,,
^•^Franz Haider, Private War Journal of Generaloberst
Franz Haider„ III, 113o
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of any Italian action in southern France but suggested
instead that Hitler conclude a compromise peace„

Opposed

to an extension of the war in the west* he urged Hitler

11
to turn back and seek Germany’s Lebensraum in the easta
Mussolini’s reluctance to undertake an operation against
the French forced Hitler to abandon his plans in this
area and to reconsider the offensive in the north„
In the same month, a German Air Force staff officer
was forced to make an emergency landing in Belgium, and a
portion of the plans for the western offensive fell into
Belgian hands0

Following the incident* Hitler postponed

the offensive until the spring of 1940, since it was neces
sary to consider modifying the plans for the offensive0
With the western offensive out of his mind for the
time being, Hitler devoted his energies to preparing for
an attack on the Scandinavian countries,,

On February 20,

he appointed General Falkenhorst, who had served in Finland
r

in 191&s to take over preparations for the attack on .Den
mark and Norway,,

It was not known definitely whether the

attack on the Scandinavian countries would precede the
western offensive until March 26 when on the reeommendations of the Navy, Hitler affirmed that "Weser Uebung”
the attack on the Scandinavian countries should come before
the attack on Francec

A week later, the Fuehrer designated

'^Alan Bullock, Hitler:
1962), 571-720

A Study in Tyranny (N0Y 0,
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April 9 as the date for the beginning of the operation„
Germany’s attack on Norway and Denmark deeply
shocked the Swiss to whom it was incomprehensible that the
two democracies should yield to Nazi demands0

Even more

incomprehensible was the fact that there were men willing
to cooperate with the aggressor against their own home
land 0

The Swiss now assumed that they saw the Nazi system

exposed;

the methodical undermining of morale in neutral

countries s creation of disorders * and the organization of
defeatism*,

12

On April IS, the Federal Council and General Guisan
issued a joint call for mobilization in the event of a sur
prise attack and prepared to take measures to combat defeat
ism among the p o p u l a c e T h e

Swiss press reacted so vio

lently to the German attack in the north that the government
was finally required to request that the press exercise
restrainto

The criticism of the Swiss press did not escape

the notice of the German Foreign Minister * Ribbentrop„

On

May 2, he announced to Hans Froelicher that the Reich, which
had already shown "angelic patience" in regard to Switzer
land;, would tolerate no more abuse from the Swiss press and
intended to retaliate in its own press„

At the same time s

Ribbentrop stated that the Reich would regard Switzerland’s
12DGFP, D, IX, 220o

13Ibid* 219o
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granting of an agrement to the Polish Exile Government as
an unfriendly act and intended to recall its minister from
Berne if the agrement were granted
Faced with the possibility of a break in diplomatic
relations, the Swiss Government informed Berlin that T,in
order to comply with the request expressed to Herr Froe
licher by the Foreign Minister , the Swiss Government would
not grant the agrement to a Polish Minister for the time
* IwV

II II IgjTMi”

being
During April9 the Swiss General Staff concentrated
on strengthening the German-Swiss frontier in preparation
for a German -invasion from the north, a measure which
necessitated further weakening of the country ?s defenses
if.
in the west0
German planning for the attack in the west took
its final form in the f,Hitler~Mansteinn plan0

On May 1 0 s

the plan was put into operation with Army Group B thrust
ing through the Low Countries toward northern France, while
Army Group A simultaneously advanced through the Ardennes
with the task of cutting off the enemy forces in northern
France from the southo

Farther south, opposing the French

between the Moselle and the Swiss frontier, Army Group G
14DGFP, D, IX, 270o
15Ibido9 271o
l^Guisan, Bericht, 26„

6g

took no offensive action until June 16 9 when it advanced
to southern France,,
The Swiss General Staff knew of German plans in
advance through a secret channel of communications, known
as the "Viking Line/1 which was maintained by the Chief
of the German Military Intelligences, Admiral Canaris
Through the-"Viking Lines," Canaris was able to inform the
Swiss of discussions in the High Command of the Armed
Forces (OKW or Oberkommando der Wehrmacht) which Involved
the possible invasion of Switzerland,,

Between May 5 and

May 7 S the Swiss were warned Of the possibility of an im
minent German invasion and advised to mobilize,,

However9

there are two possible motives for the Admiral?s initial
warning,.

Possibly he suspected that the Ardennes offen

sive would be unsuccessful? forcing Hitler to thrust his
left flank through Switzerland and.- the Belfort Gap„

On

the other hand , it is equally possible that Canaris made
this feint to alarm the French and lead them to tie down
strong forces in the Belfort area at a time when such
forces would have served a more useful function farther
“^Admiral Wilhelm Canaris s Chief of Amtsgruppe
Ausland/Abwehr (intelligence in OKW) 1938-19449 when dis
missed owing to frequent quarrels with the SS; involved
indirectly in the plot to assassinate Hitler on July 2 0 9
1944; hanged in Flossenburg concentration camp in April
1945° He has been described as "the secret genius of op
position" and his "Inner circle" as the very cabinet of
the resistance movements,' yet there is little evidence to
substantiate these claims0
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north
In any event s the attack on France came as no sur
prise to the Swiss military who had awaited the event» but
among the populace of northern Switzerland a general panic
resulted which reached its high point on the night of
May 14 o

At this moment, it appeared to Guisan that Swit

zerland stood in actual danger of an attacko

If the German

offensive at Sedan had not been successful * he expected
the release of a supplementary operation in the south
with the intention of skirting the French defensive posi
tions,,

German forces appeared to be prepared for this

objective, which would probably have run its coarse through
i9
Switzerland „
Fortunately for the Swiss, the Ardennes offensive
was a complete success , and the immediate danger diminishedo
As the western offensive progressed, the German press in
creased its caustic and insolent tone toward Switzerland„
Over the radio, songs of the Hitler.jugend scorned Swiss
independence and hinted that the Reich would deal with
Of)

Switzerland after the French were defeated0
After Italy5s entry into the war and the subsequent

114o

1$
Ian Colvin, Chief of Intelligence (London, 1951)?
/Hereaft er cited as Colvin, Chief of Intelligence07
■^Guisan, Bericht» 27-2B0
20

Peter Duerrenmatt, Kleine Geschichte der Schweiz
waehrend des Zwelten Weltkrieges (Zurich, 1943TT53.
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fall of France s German respect for Swiss neutrality de
creased proportionallyo

While the Swiss frontier was

generally respected on the ground * German pilots on flights
between Germany and occupied France tended to ignore Swiss
neutralityo

The Swiss Air Forces in turn,, defended the

air over the country 9 engaging the Luftwaffe whenever a
violation of Swiss air space occurred0

On five occasions,

both Goering vs Luftwaffe and the Swiss Air Force suffered
losses of planes and pilots0

Field Marshal (later Reichs-

21

marshal/ Hermann Goering ' was determined to halt the los
ses to his Luftwaffe over Switzerland a n d . on his own auth
ority s concocted a plan for a. sabotage mission against the
Swiss air fields 0

On June 14» nine saboteurs entered

Switzerland with the objective of sabotaging airfields
at Lausanne

j

Payerne* Biel“Boeaingens Duebendorf and Sprei-

The operation 9 designated as t!Unternehmen Wartega'

tenbacho

was strictly an amateur operation and failed completely
with most of the saboteurs taken into custody within twenty22
four hourso
"(Jnternehmen Wartegau.n was but one of a number of
Nazi attempts at sabotage and espionage in Switzerland
21

Hermann Goering } Reich Minister for ..Air* Reich
Minister for the Four-Year Plan* Commander in Chief of the
Luftwaffe throughout the war»

22

H 0R 0 Kurz, Die Schweiz in der Planung der krlegfuehrenden Maechte wa'ehrent des Zweiten Weltkrieges~TBiel s
195777" 5 7
THereafter cited as Kurz, Die Schweiz In der
Planung 0/

71
which eventually began to have a definite effect on Swiss
morale0

Switzerland was completely surrounded by Axis Powers

and occupied France, except for a narrow corridor from
Geneva to Vichy France0

Chances of being able to pursue

an independent policy were limited.,

In these circumstances;,

it is not surprising that some people felt that Switzerland
shouldj by economic and political adaptation, qualify itself
for a favorable position in Hitler’s nNew Europeo5'

During

the summer of 1940 s there was considerable public and press
discussion of renewal and adaptation of Swiss institutions
and policieso

President Pilet-Golaz, in a speech on June 2 5 s

encouraged the advocates of adaptation when he spoke of the
need for economic adaptation and warned his countrymen
that they would have to accept changes in their way of
life0

Moreover, he noted that the government would no

longer be able to explain and justify its decisions to the
publico

The President’s speech came under immediate

attack by the opponents of adaptation0

But at the same

time, the speech stimulated the defeatist element which
began to center on the Presidents
During the Battle of Britain the Nazi press attacked
the Swiss press for its alleged lack of impartiality and
accused- the Swiss of a violation of neutrality0

Restric

tions finally became a necessity; the Swiss papers were not
2S
"'Toynbee, War and the Neutrals9 2110
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allowed to publish articles and comment of a hostile or
unduly critical character which might make relations with
Germany more difficult„

In spite of the restrictions, the

Germans and their junior partnerP Italy 9 remained unappeased
Additional concessions to the Axis Powers became necessary
as the war progressed,,

Shortly after the German-French

Armistice, Switzerland agreed to hand over to Germany the
war material belonging to interned Polish and French soldiers„
German pressure also brought about the blackout of Swiss
towns at night, since their lights served to guide Allied
pilots to Axis targets
The German High Command did not seriously begin
to consider the possibility of an attack on Switzerland
until after the fall of France„

In comparison to Belgium

and Holland;, Switzerland was only of minor operational sig
nificance during the course of the w a r 9 and in the first
part of the war an outflanking of the Maginot Line through
Switzerland was never seriously c o n s i d e r e d G e r m a n troop
movements which the Swiss intelligence detected in the
vicinity of the Swiss frontier were not preparations for
an attack on Switzerland but were designed merely to deceive
24-Toynbeej War and the Neutrals 9 212 0
25Ibido
p
Bernhard von Lossbergj Im W ehrmachtfuehrungstab;
Bericht eines Generalstabsoffizlers THamburg ? 195077 u02~
Z^rei7tir~TitiT”as^Tosi¥ei^, Im Wehrmachtfuehrungstab07

the French General S t a f f T h e

mountainous character of

the country mad® it unsuitable both for troop movements
and as a staging area from which an attack on France could
be launched„

With Italy's declaration of war, Switzerland

increased in military and economic importance to the Axis,
since the main connection between Italy and Germany depended
on Swiss railways and tunnels»

In addition, Swiss deliver

ies of precision machines to Great Britain, as well as
the country's role as a rendezvous for international es
pionage, tended to focus Hitler's attention on the country»
After the victory in the west, General Jodi,

2$

Chief of the OKW Operations Staff, ordered the Operations
Staff to investigate the possibility of an attack on Swit
zerland but not to share the information with OKH or other
headquarters

The Staff based its plan upon the occupa

tion of the Swiss ’’middle-land” — the region between the
Juras and the Alps0
tarily accessibleo

This region was considered to be mili
Equally important, it contained the

major Swiss industrial centers, including the clock, machine,

27

Lossberg, Im Wehrmachtfuehrungstab 9 102-103 <>
2S
Colonel General Alfred Jodi, Chief of the OKW
Operations Staff, 1938-1945°
In Hitler's reorganization
of the German military in 1938, OKW was created as a kind
of personal working staff--an office that supplied him with
information and circulated and supervised his orders0 In
essence, OKW was a half military and half political organi
zation with no relation to real general staff work as car
ried on by OKHo
^Lossberg, Im Wehrmachffuehrungstab, 1020
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textile and aluminum i n d u s t r i e s M a j o r transportation
routes led from the Rhine and Rhone valleys into the "middle
land" and then over the Alpine passes into Italy0
The OKW plan projected an advance by light motorized
forces into Switzerland west of Lake Constance0

After

crossing the Rhine, the force was to continue advancing
toward the southwest o

A second force, composed of mountain

troops, was to begin its advance from the north on both
sides of Basel and proceed directly southo

Simultaneously,

a third force was to advance up the Rhone Valley into
southeastern Switzerland <>

OKW?s operational plan was

strictly a German undertaking with no consideration given
^1
to the possible use of Italian forces o-'-1- If successful,
the operation would encircle the mass of the Swiss Army
in the "middle land0"
Occupation of Switzerland offered considerable
economic benefits for the Reich as well as control of the
Swiss tunnels and railways which provided the main connec
tion between Italy and Germany0

The strategically impor

tant railway lines, especially the Gotthard Line and the
Simplon Line, carried most of Germanyfs supplies to Italy
30

Lossberg, Im Wehrmachtfuehrungsstab, 103-104<>

31Ibid0, 104o
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and also to the Axis forces in

A f r i c a

„32

0 K W ?s plan was never to attain operational signify
icance during the course of the w a r D

Upon its completion,

the plan was presented to General Jodi , who filed it in
his desk for use should a favorable opportunity present
itselfo
A second operational plan for military action
against Switzerland , known under the code name Operation
Tannenbaum, was undertaken at approximately the same time
as the OKW plan0

Tannenbaum„ however, was initially drawn

up by the OKH Operations Staff0

On June 25, the Operations

Staff prepared a memorandum concerning the npossibility
of a surprise occupation of Switzerland by German troops
from France and Germany, on the assumption that Italian
troops will attack simultaneously from the south„n33
In view of Switzerland?s long frontiers, OKH plan
ners expected no offensive by the Swiss Army which they
assumed would have to be restricted rather to a defense
of the completed frontier positions„

At this time (late

June 1940}, the Germans took into account th© fact that
3^The Swiss tunnels were among the longest in the
world— -Gotthard s nine miles; Simplon, 1 2 D4 miles; Loetschberg, nine miles„ The three tunnels provided the most
effective connection between Germany and Italy, which
depended heavily upon Germany for supplies, especially
coal for its steel industry,, An alternate route via the
Brenner Pass could not accommodate the amount of supplies
necessary for Italy and for the Axis forces in Africa0
33Rurz3 Die Schweiz in der Planung, 28.,
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the weakest Swiss .forces lay along the French-German border
and that a Swiss attempt to move troops to the western
frontier would correspondingly weaken the northern defenses0
Success of any operation against the Swiss depended
upon the surprise and speed with which the country could be
occupiedo

The initial OKH plan recommended that the advance

against the Swiss Army should be undertaken from several
directions to prevent formation of a unified command or an
organized withdrawal into the impassable mountainous ter
rain 0

OKH realized that a successful Swiss withdrawal into

the central massif would delay and possibly prevent a deci
sive

v i c t o r y

0

The main emphasis of the attack was placed

in the west where the Alps were to be crossed near Savoy
and the Juras penetrated at several locations while the
Rhine was being crossed in the north„

For political and

morale reasons9 it was deemed necessary to capture the capi
tal and military districts quickly and while they were still
intact 0-^5

As a final note^ the initial memorandum stated

that the possibility of settling German differences with
Switzerland by peaceful means still e x i s t e d 6
Further work on the operation was discontinued
until August j, but by this time it was necessary to consider
■^Kurz 5 Die Schweiz in der Planung, 29«.
^ ^Ibid 0
36Ibld0, 3Go
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two new problems in regard to Swiss strength,

During the

interval, Switzerland had increased the strength of its
field divisions and it could perhaps count on the help
of 40,000 interned French and Polish soldiers0
The operational plan designed in August deviated
little from the guide lines set down by the initial mem
orandum,,

The aim. of the operation was to defeat the enemy

quickly before it could retreat into the Alps„

The major

blow was to fall on the western border, since Swiss forces
in this area remained weaker than those in the north and
Swiss industrial centers could be reached most easily from
the west.

An attack across the Rhine in the north was

designed mainly as a deceptive measure, while no attack was
planned on SwitzerlandSs eastern frontier„

Heavy fortifi

cations, as well as the difficulties of terrain, presented
the attacker with too many obstacles in the east0

Italian

forces were allotted the occupation of the Chur-Davos area,
as well as the Rhone Valley„37
The task of executing Tannenbaum went to General
von Listfs Twelfth Army, which included three army corps—
the XII, XV and XVIII0

Included in the three corps were

five infantry divisions, three motorized divisions, and a
mountain division and a Panzer division„
regiments completed the force0

Two motorized SS

Because the Battle of

“^Kurz, Die Schweiz in der Planting, 30„
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Britain was still in progress» the degree of part isipa
tion by the Luftwaffe was not clearly determined s although
it was assumed that the Luftwaffe would conduct independent
bombing missions and provide ground support
While the single mountain division was to effect a
crossing of the Juras * the infantry divisions were to lead
the breakthrough of the fortified positions and move toward
the closer objectives„

To prevent a possible evasion of the

Swiss to the south or southeast * paratroop landings (which
were also limited because of the Battle of Britain) at the
Linthkanal and at- Sargens were planned D

The Luftwaffe

was assigned the tasks of destroying the enemy air forces
and providing air support for the ground troops0

By landing

Luftwaffe units at Olten* the Operations Staff hoped to
close that exit through the J u r a s -9
The timetable for the operation provided a minimum
of six dayso

Bernes Lucerne and Zurich were to be taken

during the first two days 9 while the remaining operations9
depending on the success of the Italians * would take another
three to four dayso

The operation was to take place in

the summer months* since from October to May snowfall in
the mountains would cause delays and fog might impair the
activity of the Luftwaffe0

OKH designated September as the

3 % u r z * Die Schweiz in der Planung;, 30*
39Ibido
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most favorable month04Q
The next phase of planning for Operation Tannenbaum
occurred within Army Group C 3 commanded by Field Marshal
Ritter von Leebs General von List^s immediate superior0
On August 26, General Haider signed a memorandum directing
von Leeb to submit an operational plan for an attack on
Switzerlando
Von Leeb l?s plan assigned Operation Tannenbaum to
the Twelfth Army but restricted its objective to a line
running from Lake Geneva northeast to Sargens 0

South of

the linep Italian forces were to undertake independent
operations 9 and southern Switzerland was designated as an
Italian sphere of influence0

In the north 9 the Twelfth

Army was to destroy the Swiss forces quickly by attacks
from several directions and occupy the capitolj industrial
and armament centers„

Von Leeb forwarded the skeleton plan

to the headquarters of the Twelfth Army for von List 's
comments0

As a result 9 the plan was delayed until Septem

ber 7? after which von Leeb made a final revisiono^
In contrast to the earlier plans, von Leeb shifted
the main emphasis from the center of the Jura front to its
outer flankso

Superior Panzer and motorized forces were

to advance on the southern flank between Lake Geneva and
^ K u r z , Die Schweiz in der Planung8 3 1 o
dix Ao
U Ibido , 33-34o

See Appen
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the Neuenburger see while a similar force effected an entry
in the north between Waldshut and Lake Constance0

By this

means a deep and fast advance along the western edge of the
Alps would be achieved , initiating an outflanking and encir
clement of the major enemy forces in the Swiss "middle land0"
In spite of the greater distances, flanking movements were
preferred to frontal attacks through the Juras
For the operation, von Leeb divided the Twelfth Army
Info five attack groups (Angriffsgruppen)„

Group A, composed

of two Panzer divisions, two infantry divisions, a mountain
division and a motorized division, was to cross the Swiss
frontier in the south between Lake Geneva and the Neuenburgersee0

The southern prong of the group was assigned

the task of seizing Geneva while.the major portion of the
group advanced toward Berne, Fribourg and Thun0

The moun

tain division and Infantry division of Group B were to pene
trate the Juras near Biel and advance past Biel to Burgdorfo
Group C, with two infantry divisions and a Panzer division,
was to cross the frontier in the north on both sides of Basel
and advance generally south toward Huttwilo

The strongest

northern unit (Group D) included two Panzer divisions, two
infantry divisions and a motorized divlsion<,

Its five

divisions were to cross the German-Swiss frontier between
Waldshut and Lake Constance and advance southward toward
42j[urz s Die Schweiz in der Planung, 3 5-3 6 <>
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Zuricho

Group E was to mount the only attack in the

east with a mountain division and an infantry division.
Its objectives were Stc Gallen, Gams, Glarus, Chur and
Llanz
The Luftwaffe was assigned the usual tasks of
destroying the enemy air force and the communications
systems by attacks on Berne 5, Lucerne, Thun, Interlaken,
Zurich and Solothurn0^If successful, von Leeb’s plan would encircle the
Swiss Army in the ’'middle land” before an organized retreat
could be carried out and before the Swiss could effectively
destroy the Gotthard and Simplon tunnels0
To disguise the assembly of motorized and Panzer
units near the Swiss frontiers, it was proposed to allow
an "aggravation of the occupation of France in connection
with the failure to fulfill the Armistice stipulations”
to precede the attack,,

Simultaneously, the Swiss were to

be further deceived by "benevolent handling in the German
newspapers and through economic agreements <,
Von Le e b 9s plan found unconditional support neither
with the OKH Operations Staff under Colonel Heusinger nor
with General Haider0

Heusinger found the proposed troop

^ K u r z , Die Schweiz in der Planung,
Appendix B 0
^Ibld.
45lbido

360 See

82

estimates disproportionately high in comparison to the Swiss
defensive forces0

He recommended the removal of Group E

and restriction of the operation to a single army group of
eleven divisions
General Haider also recommended removal of Group E,
but he further suggested the uniting of Groups A and B
and C and D under a single commando

The goals were modi

fied in the sense that A and B , the western units with a
strong motorized right flank, would break through the
frontier between Geneva and the Neuenburgersee and advance
to Berne and Lucerne0

The unified northern groups with

a strong motorized left flank were to cross the frontier
near Waldshut and advance southward to Lucerne0

Thus,

while the motorized outer flanks were encircling the ”mid
dle land,” the non-motorized units were to advance on
Basel, Waldshut, Olten, Solothurn and Berne0

In this way,

Haider created two operational spheres--=an inner sphere in
which the non-motorized forces operated and an outer sphere
allocated to the movement of motorized units„

The area

seized between the motorized and non-motorized forces would
contain the mass of the Swiss Army before an organized
withdrawal into the mountains could be accomplished
Haider¥s revision represented the final stage of
^6Kurz, Die Schweiz in der P.lanung,
^ ^Ibido
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.Operation Tannenbaum, but by this time (October 17, 1940),
the favorable time for execution of the operation had
passedo

Hitler was preoccupied with several other major

problems, namely the attacks on Great Britain and Russia„
In relation to these operations, Switzerland was insignifi
cant,,

In any event, the country was surrounded by Axis

territory, and there would be abundant time to deal with
the Swiss after Britain and Russia were subdued„

For the

time being, the Fuehrer was content with economic concessions
from the Swiss„

Planning for Operation Tannenbaum, while

seriously studied between June and October 1940, remained
in the nature of preparations in adventumo
The Swiss were alarmed by stories and rumors that
Hitler intended to invade the country,,

But such informa

tion was spread by Nazi agents in Switzerland as well as by
the German press in order to encourage Swiss defeatists and
to insure that Switzerland would not allow any Allied brea
ches of its neutralityo

State Secretary von Weizsaeker,

former Minister to Switzerland, noted in his Memoirs that
such stories were in the nature of warning shots, but had
no foundation in facto

"If there had really been any in

tention of invading Switzerland, this would not have escaped
the notice of my still existing informants at 0KWoT'4fi
While planning for Tannenbaum continued throughout
^Weizsaeker, Memoirs, 243°
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the summer of 1940 , the Swiss undertook measures to combat
the growing defeatism in Switzerland and to revise the de
fensive measures to be taken in the event of a German at
tack o

On June 25, General Guisan issued the order of the

day to his troop commanders assembled on the Ruetli Meadow,
the legendary spot where the Swiss Confederation had been
founded in 1291 o

Guisan urged his officers to ignore the

defeatists and remain steadfast in their resistance„

The

defeatist atmosphere, which had been intensified by Musso
lini ‘'s declaration of war and the fall of France, had made
serious inroads among both the civil population and the
army.

At the Ruetli Meadow, Guisan made a patriotic appeal

to the nation as a whole0

To the army, he stated that as

long as the slightest expectation of military success
existed the duty to defend Swiss honor must be observed
to the utmost
To facilitate defense of the country, the general
introduced the concept of the ’’National Redoubt,” a natural
defensive system based on the Alpine fortresses of the
Gotthard, Sargens and Sto M a u r i c e I n

the event that the

Swiss Army could not prevent a German breakthrough of the
frontier fortifications, the ’’National Redoubt” provided
49H oRo Kurz, Die Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg:
Das
grosse Erinnerungswerk an die Aktivdienstzeit„ 1939-194.5
TThun7~T9^0T7l6: /Hereafter cited as Kurz, Die Schweiz im
Zweiten Weltkriego/
5°Tbxdo,

l8l0

35
a well-provisioned stronghold into which an organized re
treat could be conductedo

In essence, the villages and

towns of Switzerland were to be left to the invader0

A

successful withdrawal into the Alps offered the Swiss an
opportunity to carry on partisan and guerrilla warfare
against the occupier, thus preventing a quick defeat and
forcing Germany to engage in a long and extensive opera
tion,,

The Swiss intended to destroy factories , armament

centers and the tunnels themselves rather than allow them
to fall into German hands intact 0
Taking account of the concept of the "Redoubt,n
German planning for an attack on Switzerland emphasized
the necessity of a quick victory over the Swiss while
simultaneously blocking all routes of escape into the
Alps o
Only a few days after Guisan?s address at Ruetli,
a preliminary compilation of French documents captured
at Dijon indicated collaboration of the Swiss General
Staff with its French counterpart0

Official staff conver

sations had not taken place, but semi-official conversations
between Guisan and a French liason officer, L t „ Colonel
Garteiser, had occurred between May 1939 and March 19400
The documents provided no evidence of French plans for
marching into Switzerland for offensive reasons, but French
intervention had been forseen in case of a German attack
on Switzerland,,^
51DGFP, D, XI, 14”15o

S6

Although the evidence provided Hitler with a valid
excuse to attack Switzerland, no German action followed,,
Hitler was deeply concerned with British reaction to Ger

man peace feelers, hoping that Great Britain would be
willing to consider peace negotiations,,

Quite possibly

Hitler did not- want to engage in further aggression until
sure of Britain?s position,,

In any case, events in Swit

zerland were proceeding to Germany’s advantage and satis
faction,,

Swiss defeatists began to clamor for Guisan?s

dismissal and the demobilization of the Swiss

A r m y „ 52

It appeared possible that Germany might achieve its goals
in Switzerland without resorting to an attack,,
Weizsaeker, who feared that Hitler might use the
documents as an excuse to attack Switzerland, informed the
Swiss through Theo Kordt, one of Canaris’s agents in the
Berne Legation,,

In Berlin, the State Secretary used his

position to convince his colleagues in the Foreign Office
that an attack on Switzerland would mean the immediate
destruction of the Swiss tunnels and a subsequent paralysis
of Italy’s steel industry for lack of coal„53

Admiral

Canaris worked closely with the State Secretary to dis
courage a German invasion of Switzerland, and it is possible
that their activity played an important role in Germany’s
52DGFP, D, XI, 14»15.
^Weizsaeker, Memoirs, 243»
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decision not to take any action,,
After October 1940, Switzerland received little
attention from the German High Command„

Military and poli

tical considerations elsewhere in Europe occupied Hitler
and his advisers0

The Swiss utilized the time to fortify

and provision the"National Redoubt," while various economic
concessions sufficed to allow Switzerland almost two years
of relative peace„
The German press retained its arrogant tone, re
minding the Swiss that they were originally part of the
Reich and generally giving the impression that Germany was
too busy to concern itself with Switzerland at the moment0
In a speech at the Sportpalast 9 Hitler made reference to the
"bourgeois states that would not survive the war,"

Swit

zerland represented the most obvious example of such a
stateo

Paul Schmidt, Press Chief in the Foreign Ministry,

threatened Swiss editors and journalists with deportation
to Siberia or liquidation after the occupation of Switzer
land „54

Between the fall of 1940 and the fall of 1-942,

Germany generally paid little attention to the presence
of a neutral, democratic state in the midst of Axis dominated
Europeo

The German press occasionally reminded the Swiss

that their independence would be terminated when Hitler
finished with Britain and Russia„

But even the press

had little time to delegate to Switzerland during the
54T0ynbee, War and the Neutrals, 2210
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Russian campaign,
Switzerland utilized the interim to discourage
defeatist and treasonable activity,

Nineteen officers

and men of the Swiss Army were sentenced to death for
treason, while an additional number were given life sen
tences o

Arrests for espionage and sabotage totaled 312

by 1942 s most of them Germans and Italians0^5

In addition s

the pro-Nazi National Front Movement was banneds press
censorship and rule by decree introduced.
It was not until the fall of 1942 that Germany
again began to consider an invasion of Switzerland,

Feel

ing that the Allies might in the future be thrusting into
the ’’soft underbelly of Europe” the position of neutral
Switzerland attracted Ribbentrop ys attention.

In a note

to the Legation In Berne he requested a report on the
length of time for which the Swiss were equipped with pro
visions and raw materials.

The Legation pointed out in a

detailed report that the Swiss had stored enough raw material
and provisions to enable them to hold out for as long as two
years in the ’’National Redoubt,”

Realizing the motives

behind the Foreign Minister ?s inquiry, Koecher emphasized
that the Swiss would provide obstinate resistance and would ;
on no account allow the vital communications routes through
55weizsaeker, Memoirs a 90°
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the Gotthard and Simplon Tunnels to fall intact into German
hands„^
Admiral Canaris, informed of Ribbentrop’s inquiry
through the Berne Legation, set his communications line
into operation and warned the Swiss military of Ribbentrop’s
planso

However, the Admiral’s warning in this case differed

from his earlier warnings„

Abwehr had information of Allied

pressure on the Swiss to cut all rail communications between
Germany and Italy, and allow Allied agents to blow up the
Gotthard tunnel»

Through the warning, Canaris intended to

convey a threat to the Swiss and so keep rail communications
openD51
In September 1942, Colonel Masson, Chief of the
Swiss Federal Intelligence Service (Nachriehtendienst),
established contact with SS General Walter Schellenberg,
head of the SS Foreign Intelligenee0

Schellenberg suggested

a meeting for the purpose of discussing a possible German
”preventive occupation” of Switzerland<> Certain circles
in Germany were doubtful of Switzerland’s intention to
defend its neutrality, especially in view of an Allied
landing in Italyc

Masson and Schellenberg met at Laufenburg

in late September 1942, and Masson assured him of Switzerland’s
intention to resist any violation of the nation’s neutrality„
^Abshagen, Canaris (Stuttgart, 1957), 346-47o

5^Colvin, Chief of Intelligence, 205=2060
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The Swiss General Staff hoped to use the opportunity of con
tact with Schellenberg to impress upon the Reich leaders
that an attack on Switzerland would be an undertaking too
costly to be profitable0
Although Hitler had been irked by Switzerland's
neutrality and independences, the advantages which would
have accrued from its invasion and conquest had been clearly
outweighed by the drawbackso

The Germans were well aware

that an attack would be strongly resisted by the Swiss whose
first defensive step would be to destroy the Gotthard and
Simplon tunnels0

Restoration would be a lengthy undertaking

even under favorable conditions, but harassed by guerrilla
warfare by the Swiss the task of rebuilding the tunnels
would present the conquerors with almost insuperable dif
ficulties o

Moreover, Switzerland's main assets * which

were economic and financial , would be wiped out0

As there

would be no compensatory rewards in the shape of raw mater
ials and surplus food, a devastated and impoverished Swit
zerland would be a liability rather than an asset„59

How

ever , as the Allies continued to turn the tide in Africa

and it became apparent than an invasion of Europe through
Italy was imminent s Switzerland's strategic location increased
5^Bernard Barbey, Fuenf Jahre auf dem Kommandoposten
des Generals (Berne, 1 9 4 S a f t e r
cited as
Barbey, Fuenf Jahre07
^Toynbeej, The War and the Neutrals „ 2210
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in importance to Berlin0

In March 1943 * OKW again took up

the question of a ''preventive occupation" of Switzerland0
General Schellenberg again contacted Masson and
informed him that "Case Switzerland"
being considered by 0KWo

("Fall Schweiz") was

Masson9s assurances of the pre

vious September no longer sufficed in Berlin; therefore a
meeting with a leading Swiss personality was desired0
General Schellenberg9s motives in March 1943 j as well as
in September 1942, remain obscure»

Allegedly he intended

to use the meetings in Switzerland to warn the Swiss to
prepare for a possible German attacko

In so doing, his

objective was to force the Swiss to take defensive pre
cautions so that he could use the fact as an argument against
60
Hitler ?s intended onslaught <,
Colonel Masson arranged a meeting between Schellen
berg and General Buisan on March 9°

Before Schellenberg

was allowed to travel to Switzerland, Hitler expressed
certain doubts about the conference0

He feared that Schel

lenberg might use the opportunity to escape to England by
plane and be held there like Rudolf Hessc

On the other

hand, the Fuehrer feared that the Italians would get word
of the affair since Schellenberg was known to be an import
ant personality in frequent contact with Himmler0

Schel

lenberg !s trip to Switzerland might be interpreted by the
Italians as an omen of defeat, since it appeared that
^ % i l h e l m Hoettl, The Secret Front (N0Y 0 , 1954) 9 64o
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Rommel*s defeat in Tunisia was imminent

After some

hesitation* Hitler finally gave his approval, and Schellen
berg met

Guisan at Biglen0

The SS general expressed the

fear that the Swiss were not determined to defend the countryfs
neutrality against the Allies if it should be necessary
Guisan assured him of the determined conviction of the Swiss
Army to fulfill its task under all circumstances and its
intention to fight against anyone who should violate Swiss
neutrality
Whether Schellenberg on his return to Berlin de
cidedly influenced Hitler?s decision is difficult to deter
mine o

In his memoirs, Schellenberg asserted that through

his influence with Himmler he was able to prevent the German
occupation of Switzerland in 1943°64
On March 19* the Swiss learned that OKW intended to
examine the location of Switzerland in relation to the
general situation ivy Italy and the Mediterranean,,^

Addi

tional reports reached the Swiss that General Dietl, the
’’Hero of Narvik*” had assembled in Munich a special ”Kom~
mando Schweiz” whose task it was to lead the advance on
Switzerlando

In particular* paratroop units were said to

Barbey* Fuenf Jahre, 167-6$,,
62Ibido, 1680
Guisan* Bericht„ $2„
^Stfalter Schellenberg* The Labyrinth;
Walter Schellenberg (N0Y 0 * 19567'““377
'
^bGuisan* Bericht, 53°
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be assigned to Dietl8s force in large numbers,,

It was their

task to open an access into the ’’National R e d o u b t D u r i n g
the following days it was learned that the "SS Circletabove all Himmler and Sepp Dietrich--were in favor of the
plan, while the generals and economic advisers opposed it<,66
Finally, on March 23, Schellenberg8s personal envoy
appeared at the headquarters of the Swiss General Staff and
announced that the Swiss could be satisfied with Schellenberg,
for the danger of an attack had passed0

On the same day,

word came via the "Viking Line" that "Case Switzerland" had
been called off0^7
Research since then, in particular the questioning
of reliable German personalities who were involved in the.
events of March 1943, indicate that the German leadership
entertained no immediate aggressive intentions toward Swit
zerland „

It is certain today that General Dietl was present

almost without interruption at the headquarters of the Twen
tieth Gebirgsarmee in Finnish Lappland, where he was occu
pied with preparations for defense against an expected
Russian offensive on the German-Finnish front„

The asser

tion that Dietl was to provide the leadership for the attack
on Switzerland served a propagandistic function, for the
use of the name of the successful mountain general and "Hero
^Kurz,

Die Schweiz im Zweiten Welt k r i e g , 6 6 0

67Barbey? Fuenf Jahre, 1?20
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of Narvik”

promised psychological results0

in essence, had no military significance0

The March alarm,

Its main objective

was to convince the Swiss that failure to defend their fron
tier against possible Allied infringement might lead to a
German preventive occupation of the country=

Preventive

occupation also provided a means to extract additional
economic concessions from the Swiss„

On December 31? 1943?

the German-Swiss trade agreement of 1941 was to expire
without Germany fulfilling its stipulated commitments0

It

is therefore possible that Germany used the March alarm as
a means of applying economic pressure
In December 1943 ? the possibility of a German inva
sion of Switzerland was discussed for the last time0

Unlike

the previous operations, this final episode originated with
the SS0

The SS version was designated as a "Memorandum on

the military location of Switzerland under special considera
tion of necessary German interventionD?,^9

The operational

planning took place in the Waffenhauptamt of the SS under
the direction of Colonel Boehme0

The Axis encirclement of

Switzerland represented a favorable operational position,
permitting consideration of a minimum of forces to achieve
two goals simultaneously— destruction of the Swiss army and
elimination of support by the Allies„

Boehme planned the

6g
Kurz, Die Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg? 66-67«
69

Kurz, Die Schweiz in der Planung, 49=
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offensive in two phases, the first of which was designed to
capture the "middle land," its air fields and the major
portion of the enemy forces,,

The second phase consisted of

a thrust into the "National Redoubt" and occupation of its
transportation routes.

Above all, Boehme counted on the

paralyzing effect of surprise coupled with the physical
shock of massed artillery and tanks.

He believed that he

could be successful with about twelve divisions in addition
to Sondertruppen and expected losses of approximately twenty
per cent,
Boehme5s memorandum bore the date December 20, 1943
and was planned as a "War for the Summer Months,"

Therefore,

at the earliest the plan would be executed in the summer of
1944? at; which time the Allied invasion was already in
progress.

In addition, by this time Germany no longer

possessed a significant number of paratroop divisions
which Boehme intended to use in the operation against the
"National Redoubt,"

Since the whole operation was based

upon assumptions no longer attainable, It never proceeded
past the planning stage,71
By 1944, the threat of a German invasion of Switzer
land had largely disappeared,
Russia, Italy and France,

German forces were engaged in

Militarily, Germany could not

70Rurz, Die Schweiz in der Planung, 49-51.
71Ibid, 50=51.
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risk tying down valuable forces in Switzerland, even if
enough forces could be foundD

On the other hand, as Nazi

power declined, the appeal of Nazism and the Swiss fear of
an invasion also declined proportionally0

Germany was left

with no choice but to depend on the Swiss to defend their
neutrality against the Allies, if necessary«
Swiss fears that the Allies might violate their
frontier proved unfounded0

After D-Day, General Guisan

wished to call up additional forces, but upon considering
the effect of mobilization upon the existent food supplies,
the mobilization was restricted to frontier forces0

After

the Allied landing in southern France on August 15? 1944?
further partial mobilization was ordered„

Advance guards

of American forces reached the Swiss on August 2$, allow
ing Switzerland to resume contact with the outside world0
With the exception of the British Isles, Spain,
Portugal and Sweden, Switzerland was the only European
state to maintain its independence during the w a r Q

For

three basic reasons, Germany failed to incorporate Switzer
land into the Third Reicho
First of all, Nazism failed to gain a foothold in
Switzerland as it had in Austria and In the Sudetenlando
Switzerland’s initial fear of German designs on Swiss ter
ritory prevented the growth of a substantial Nazi movement
among the Swiss»

The Swiss, in general, were not interested
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in seeing their independent state

merged with a "Greater

Germany,” and Nazi racism failed to make converts„

Thus,

conditions failed to materialize for a bloodless conquest.
Secondly, during the course of the war, Hitler and
his advisers were continually absorbed with problems more
militarily and economically significant than an operation
against the Swiss.

France, Great Britain, the Balkans

and Russia were immeasurably more important to the Reich
than was Switzerland.

In essence, Switzerland’s position

on Hitler’s agenda came after the completion of the campaign
against Russia.
Thirdly, the occupation of Switzerland carried with
it certain risks.

The destruction of the Gotthard and

Simplon tunnels by the Swiss in the event of a German inva
sion was a possibility that the High Command could not com
pletely rule out.

If this were accomplished, the German

venture would yield no positive gains.

The Swiss Army,

although relatively small, would have offered determined
resistance before withdrawing into the "National Redoubt.”
In the event that the Swiss could carry out an organized
withdrawal into the "Redoubt,” Germany would be faced with
a long and costly campaign.
For these reasons, Hitler was content to allow the
Swiss to continue their independent existence in the heart
of Nazi dominated Europe.

From time to time, political

and military pressure was applied to prevent a possible

9S

Swiss deviation toward the Allies, while economic concessions
were extracted to aid the Reich’s war effort„

Rumors of an

imminent invasion and threats of a preventive occupation,
which were circulated throughout the war, were utilized to
achieve psychological and economic goals„

Germany, in

essence had no immediate intention to invade Switzerland
until completion of the war with Russia.

CHAPTER IV
SWITZERLAND AND NAZI WAR ECONOMY, 193&-1945
Germany and Switzerland, both highly industrialized
states, had a long tradition of close economic cooperation^,
Switzerland, however, being a landlocked state and poorly
supplied with native raw materials, depended heavily on
imports to maintain its existence0

Major deficiencies ex

isted in its supply of coal and iron as well as in textiles
and fertilizers»

In general, Swiss prosperity depended

upon the state’s position as an "international workshop,"
while imports provided a considerable proportion of food
stuffs and raw materials0

Payment for such imports was

met by the export of high-quality manufactured goods»

In

addition,, Switzerland was an important banking and financial
center which derived considerable income from its tourist
trade and the trade in luxury items„

Only twenty per cent

of the 2,000,000 Swiss following a trade or profession were
engaged in agriculture, and the income of agricultural
workers amounted to only nine per cent of the total national
incomeo

On the other hand, fifty-two per cent of the people

were engaged in industry, trade, commerce and banking
*|
Arnold Toynbee and Veronica Toynbee (ed0), Survey oi
International Affairs, 1939-1946s The War and the Neutrals
(London, 1956), 203-204.
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Swiss prosperity and the state’s high standard of living
depended on Switzerland’s ability to maintain a high level
of foreign trade,,
Traditionally, Germany had been among the major
suppliers of raw material to Switzerland as well as one
of its most important customers„

By 1 9 3 the Reich was

both the greatest supplier of raw material to Switzerland
and the state’s best customer.

France, Italy and Great

Britain followed Germany as the major European exporters
to Switzerland„

After Germany, Great Britain had been the

largest importer of Swiss goods before the war„2
Although Switzerland had declined to a mere object
of the Great Powers in world politics, that object became
of great importance in wartime because of its peculiar
situation in military strategy„

The most important trans

portation route between the north and south of central
Europe, the Gotthard Tunnel, lay in the territory of the
Swiss stateo

One of the most important routes between

east and w e s t , which had often served as a convenient
transit route in the past, also crossed Switzerland,,
These factors gave Switzerland a controlling key position
in the central Alpine

region„3

The Gotthard line (Essen-

2
W 0N„ Medlicott, The Economic Blockade, I (London,
1952), 223 o /Hereafter cited as Medlicott, Economic
BloekadeT/
3
J Bon jour, Swiss Neutrality,, 102-103«

101

Basle-Milan) represented the most efficient connection be
tween Germany and Italy and proved to be a major asset to
Swiss bargaining power in negotiations with Germany,,
Economically, Switzerland's position was potentially
more vulnerable than its military position, since the state
was bounded on the north and south by Axis powers„

The

Anschluss of 193$ left Switzerland enclosed on three sides
by Axis territory and led the Swiss to take measures for
defense of the country as well as to undertake preliminary
preparations for establishing a wartime economy„

On April 1,

193$, the Federal Council enacted a law designed to "safe
guard the country's supply of goods of vital necessity
o o o in the event of economic isolation or of war
In September of the same year, the Swiss Minister
to Berlin initiated efforts to secure from Germany a declara
tion in principle that the Reich would maintain a supply
of essential material to Switzerland in time of war*
requests were made in Paris and Rome0

Similar

Negotiations were

carried on until June 1939, when it was agreed that both
sides would maintain freight traffic "so far as possible"
in the event of w a r 0

Further negotiations were undertaken

to consider to what extent the mutual exchange of goods
could be maintained,,5
^Toynbee, War and the Neutrals, 204o
5dgfp, d, v, 693 o
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By 193 B, it was obvious to Germany, as well as to
Great Britain and France, that in the event of a major
war many of.Switzerlandfs traditional sources of income,
particularly the tourist trade and the luxury trade, would
be hard hit and that the Swiss would have to place greater
reliance on their export of products which served the war
needs of the belligerents„

Both sides needed Swiss manu

factures of war material, technical instruments and machines0
Swiss economic policy after the Anschluss was in
fluenced not only by Germany but was subject to intense
pressure from Great Britain as wello

Swiss concessions

to the Reich carried the danger of British economic retalia
tion, particularly extension of the blockade to include
Switzerland after the war began„

On the other hand, con

cessions to Great Britain involved the danger of German
occupation of Switzerland.

The danger from Germany repre

sented the greatest threat, and the Swiss tended to align
themselves closer to the Reich as Europe moved toward wa r 0
In an attempt to restrict Swiss exports to Germany,
Great Britain proposed in November 193& that Switzerland
undertake not to export to Germany specific products pro
duced from raw materials which were imported and to limit
exports of commodities produced in Switzerland from domestic
resources0

Britain, in turn, was prepared to take from

Switzerland guaranteed quantities of certain commodities0
In addition, the Swiss were invited to restrict theif
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imports from all sources to global figures corresponding to
their imports over the past three years, less any exports
to Germany, and to furnish guarantees that none of the
goods admitted would be re-exported to Germany,,

The pro

posals were considered in Berne, but no further action was
taken until after the beginning of the war ,,6
In the meantime, German-Swiss negotiations for a
war-trade agreement were initiated, and on October 24, 1939
an agreement was concluded„

By its terms, Swiss exports

to Germany were to be limited to approximately half of the
value of Swiss imports from Germany0

The balance of the

German exports to Switzerland were to be devoted to repay
ment of Germany?s debt to Switzerland.

Swiss exports to

Germany, according to the agreement, were not to be in
creased but were to be maintained at the stipulated level,
which approximated the normal peacetime level»

The Swiss

assumed that Germany would be unable to maintain its ex
ports to Switzerland, and the consequence by the terms of
the agreement would be a proportionate diminuation of Swiss
exports to Germany»7

The Swiss were particularly anxious

to maintain their economy by exporting manufactured products
to Germany, even though such products might contain raw
materials from other countries.

The Swiss Government,

^Hedlicott, Economic Blockade, I, 224»
7Ibido , 225-26o
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however, assured Britain that such exports would be res
tricted to goods, the value of which was determined to a
large degree by the Swiss labor put into them*,^
Because of Italian neutrality and friendship in
the early months of the war, the Swiss were able to import
large quantities of goods to increase their reserve stocks0
While the first months of the war were marked by a large
decrease in foreign trade, there was a rapid rise in the
following months, particularly of imports, which exceeded
those of normal years in both value and w e i g h t D u r i n g
the "phoney war,” the Swiss experienced little difficulty
with the Reich, which adopted a generous export policy
toward Switzerland„

Until the collapse of France, Germany

was content to adapt to the changing economic situation
by minor alterations of the German-Swiss Transfer and
Payments Agreement which was due to expire on June 30,
194Go
During the first six months of the war, Switzerland
found itself under pressure, not from Germany, but from
Great Britain, which threatened to include Switzerland in •
its blockade of German-occupied Europe <> After several
months of negotiations, an Anglo-French-Swiss war-trade
agreement was reached on April 25, 1940 which lightened
^Medlicott, Economic Blockade, I, 226 <>
^Toynbee, War and the Neutrals, 209»

to some extent the effects of the blockade on Swiss exports
and imports.

In essence, the agreement stipulated that

certain classes of goods could be re-exported to the enemy
or to neutral countries under specified conditions.

How

ever, goods comprising valuable raw materials were allowed
through contraband controls only upon production of "certi
ficates of guarantee," which guaranteed that such goods
would not be re-exported,-^

Allied policy toward Switzer

land was to allow carefully regulated imports through the
blockade as long as the Swiss Government seemed able and
willing to strive for some degree of independence of Axis
control,

Switzerland merely had to guarantee that the

goods would not be exported in the same condition as that
in which they were imported,

Quantative restrictions were

not imposed, and the Swiss were free to export to the
enemy,- to the Allies and to other neutrals,^3In late April 1940, Germany and Switzerland began
preliminary negotiations for a new transfer and payments
agreement.

Since the old agreement was due to expire at

the end of June, Germany made the following demands in
advance as a pre-requisite for an extension of the clearing
agreement;
1,

Transfer of all assets in special accounts in cash
foreign exchange to Berlin,
•^Toynbee, War and the .Neutrals, 209,
•^-Medlicott, Economic Blockade« II, 207,
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20
3o
4*

Free choice of purchases drawn on the clearing
balanceo
Treatment on a footing of real equality with enemy
states as regards deliveries of war material, 0 <> □
Transfer to us /Germany/ of current Dutch, Belgian
and Norwegian orders of war materials, or the raw
materials and production facilities earmarked for
that purpose,12
The Swiss accepted only demand one, and three weeks

later Germany stopped its coal exports to Switzerland,
Upon resumption of the talks in Berne on June 15 > 1940,
the Swiss agreed to demands three and four and by decree
carried out an absolute embargo for war material and trans
ferred twenty-eight million francs to the Reichsbank, even
without restoration of the coal exports by Germany,13
Germany viewed Switzerland as na huge armaments
plant which was working almost exclusively for Britain and
Franceo”!^

Consequently, the German negotiators took the

stand that, under the ’’changed circumstances,” lifting of
the coal embargo would be possible only i f i
1,

20
3°
4°

The entire former deliveries of aluminum to England
from Switzerland (i0e 0, 12,000 tons of raw aluminum
plus $ ^500 tons of aluminum alloys) are absolutely
delivered to Germany in the futurej
watch mechanisms, watch jewels, and industrial
diamonds are opened to export in the future without
restriction °9
the unimpeded export of raw materials needed for the
active finishing (conversion) process is opened at
once j
considerable additional orders for machine tools
12DGFP, D, X, 175o
*3Ibido, 175-76 .
14 Ibid0. D, IX, 446-47o
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5»

and war material can be placed at once on a short
term basis and the necessary nonferrous metals for
this are contributed from Swiss stocks;
these orders and in addition considerable deliver
ies of food stuffs are carried out through the
coal-iron account and the agricultural account
on the basis of a credit in the amount of a total
of 120 million Swiss f r a n c s »
Finding themselves almost completely surrounded

by the Axis Powers and fearing a possible invasion of their
own countryj the Swiss delegates were forced to make concessions--but on the condition that the coal embargo be lifted
and necessary deliveries be assured0

In regard to the first

demand, Germany received from Switzerland all the aluminum
formerly delivered to Great Britain on the condition that
Germany assure delivery to Switzerland of the necessary
aluminum oxide from Italy, France and Germany„

The Swiss

accepted demands two and three without reservation..

By

demand four, additional ordering of machine tools and war
material was agreed upon up to the limits of the actual
capacity of the Swiss factories0

In regard to the fifth

demand, the Swiss promised to make available a credit for
payment of the additional articles of demand four and for
agricultural products in the amount of coal deliveries actu
ally made0

This meant that for every ton of coal delivered

Germany received deliveries of the same value in return and
an equivalent once again as credit for payment of the addi
tional orders of war materialo-^
15DGFP, D, X, 175-760
l6Ibi.d, . 176 o
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Field Marshal Goering, whose Luftwaffe had suffered
several losses over Switzerland, emphasized his general
dissatisfaction with the attitude of the Swiss during the
negotiationso

He suggested that the Swiss be handled

"very toughly" and demanded during a discussion at Karinhall that Switzerland must be denied coal until the ninety
Messerschmidt airplanes delivered to Switzerland in 1939
and 1940 were returned to Germany0

However, the German

negotiators impressed the Field Marshall with the hard
line already taken in regard to Switzerland and expressed
doubt that the planes could be returned o-*-?
By July 9 S 1940, the German delegates were satis
fied with the course of the negotiations and notified Ber
lin that it was possible that the amount of credit as mea
sured against the coal deliveries actually made might be
further increased and possibly doubled0

The head of the

German delegation, Dr„ Hans Hemmen,-*-^ cautioned that the
Reich should not attempt demands beyond that and should
not make the return of the Messerschmidts a prerequisite
for lifting the coal embargo o-^-9
The new Transfer and Payments Agreement was signed
17d g f p s C, X, 110o
1g
D r 0 Hans hemmen; Chairman of the Special Commis
sion on economic questions with the German Armistice Com=mission0
1 9D G F P » D, x, 1760
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on August 9? 1940o

Its most significant result was the

alteration of Swiss imports against Swiss exports to Ger
many 5 which comprised seventy-five per cent of German
payments to Switzerland„

Germany undertook to deliver coal

to the same extent as in 1939s & favorable yearD

Swit

zerland agreed to supplement the agricultural and industrial
exports and, in order to prevent delays in delivery to
Germany, made advances to Swiss exporters»

Exports of

weapons to Britain ceased , and there was a corresponding
increase in such supplies to Germany and Italyo

The value

of the latter in Swiss francs was estimated at 33 million
to Germany and 34 million to Italy in 1940 and 122 million
to Germany and 6.1 million to Italy in 1941
Germany took advantage of the negotiations to intro
duce a counter-blockade against Great Britain0

For some

times, Germany had overlooked the Swiss export of goods by
rail through unoccupied France0

Goods for Britain and the

United States were freely consigned by this route via Spain
to Portugalo

Various transit arrangements in August 1940

put an end to this route„

On August 29, Germany issued an

ordinance stating that, as of.September 1, 1940, certain
commodities named in the German tariff had to have transit
permits

(Geleitscheine) issued by the legation in Berne

for transit in Germany and German-occupied territory;
^^Medlicott, Economic Blockade, I, 5$£0
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similar instructions were issued to Italian c u s t o m s 0

Pre

viously , the French Government had agreed that transit via
both occupied and unoccupied France should be subject to
license and to German export c o n t r o l ,

The effect of these

regulations was to give the German legation in Berne a
rigid, control over Swiss exports to all d e s t i n a t i o n s 0

A

comprehensive list was drawn up defining war m a t e r i a l s , and
such goods could not be exported at a l l 0

A further list com

prised goods requiring the G e l e i t s c h e i n ; all goods and raw
material of w a r potential fell w i t h i n this l i s t c

Finally,

there was a provision w h e r e b y the residue of Swiss exports;,
not covered by any of the l i s t s , could be exported in "nor
m al quantities" based on the years 1937 and 193$«

Transit

permits were nece s s a r y for approximately sixty per cent of
21

Swiss exports to B r i t a i n „

Germany continued to strengthen its control over
Switzerland by other m e a s u r e s »

B y September 1940, an

increased amount of Swiss letter post was routed through
Germany via S t u t t g a r t „

Germany also exerted influence

on Swiss trading and financial arrangements w i t h occupied
and satellite s t a t e s „

Between August 28 and September 20 „

1940, negotiations in Berne led to new arrangements a f 
fecting traffic and payments to Bohemia, Moravia, Norway,
Holland and Belgium,,
21

Trading and financial relations

Medlicott, Economic Blockade„ I, 5$$°
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with Poland were regulated by a provisional agreement arrang
ing for transactions to be carried out on a compensation
basis o

From January 1, 1-941, trade with territories incor

porated in the Reich were settled through the German-Swiss
clearing, a special account being created for former Polish
territoryo

22

The Anglo-French-Swiss war trade agreement of 1940
still remained, although the French had withdrawn and the
remaining two governments recognized that few of its provisions were still applicable0

German economic dominance

of Swiss trade caused concern in London, where an extension
of the economic blockade to include Switzerland was con
sidered „

However, in the Ministry of Economic Warfare there

still existed considerable support for the view that as
long as the Swiss Government struggled to preserve some
degree of independence Britain should offer the encourage
ment of only carefully regulating exports to Switzerland0
The British were understandably reluctant to allow the
Swiss to import through Axis-controlled territory, goods
which might be taken by the Axis Powers0

They also feared

that the Germans might bring pressure on the Swiss to dis
gorge goods imported for their own use0

After prolonged

discussion, an agreement was reached on October 15, 1940
under which Britain agreed to relax the blockade in order
^Medlicott, Economic Blockade, I, 5$9°
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to allow Switzerland to import certain essential commodi
ties when its existing stocks did not exceed two months?
supply0

This concession was to be cancelled if it became

evident that the Swiss had been obliged to give way to
German pressure for the re-export of imported goods 3 or
if the goods were retained by the Italian or Vichy govern
ments on the w a y 0

Britain also agreed to release some

more of the ships which had been chartered by the Swiss
and which had been detained by the British after the fall
of

F r a n c e

ip was agreed that on political grounds

there were major advantages to be gained if the risk of
continuing imports were taken0

The possibility of obtain

ing from Switzerland much-needed goods of small bulk—
precision instruments s watches, fuse mechanisms— still
existedj but such exports depended on the good will of
Swiss authorities which might be lost if the blockade
were enforced 0

Furthermore9 Switzerland served as a clear

ing house for prisoners of w a r 8 and it would be an inconven
ience not to have Switzerland in charge of German interests0
Finally, information on Germany from the British legation
in Berne was of great importance for war purposes„

Hence,

economic contacts with Switzerland were accepted for the
time beingo

Great Britain felt that is was ?,a little

unfair to the Swiss to class them with Vichy— a discredited
^Toynbee, War and the Neutrals, 217-1$°
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clique 0n2^
Switzerland's policy was based on the belief that
neutrality could be maintained throughout the course of
the w a r , and accordingly it sought to strengthen its one
great bargaining counter;

control of the Gotthard Tunnel

which had become the life-line of the German-Italian war
ef fort*^

Italian industry imported practically all of

its coal from Germany0

Since early 1940, when the British

put an end to shipment of German coal to Italy by water
(down the Rhine to Rotterdam and then around Spain to
Genoa}, the coal needed to operate Italian industries—
one million tons per m o n t h - h a d to be transported by lando
The Gotthard line, which rah from Basle on the GermanSwiss frontier to Chiasso on the Italian-Swiss frontier,,
provided the most direct route.

In addition to coal,

Germany supplied Italy with other important raw materials,
including iron, steel, wood and base m e t a l s T h e

Gott

hard route was not used for the transport of German forces
to Italyo

When necessary, the Reich utilized the Brenner

Pass route to transport additional forces to Italy0
As previously mentioned, new Swiss military plans
were drawn up which provided for withdrawal of the army
^Medlicott, Economic Blockade, I, 590o
25Ibid., II, 207.
EoS„ Hediger, "Switzerland in W a r t i m e Foreign
Policy Reports„ XVIII (1943)i 2630
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into the central masiff, or "National Redoubt
event of an i n v a s i o n 0

in the

The army was maintained on a w a r

footings, defense works u n d e r t a k e n , and Germany left w i t h
no doubt that the destruction of the tunnels would be
certain in the event of an i n v a s i o n „
Great Britain hoped to encourage Switzerland's
will to resist German pressure by adapting the economic
blockade to Switzerland's peculiar positions, but by April
1941 it was obvious that the Swiss were drifting more and
more under Axis i n f l u e n c e „

The fact that the Swiss economic

machine was largely at the disposal of the Axis was endorsed
when Swiss authorities announced, under German pressure, that
unrestricted exports of goods in two-kilogram packets were
prohibited , further reducing the flow of Swiss exports
to the outside w o r l d 0^7

In June and July, there followed

a series of new economic agreements w i t h Germany,
and the satellite s t a t e s 0

Italy

Between July 6 and July 1 4 9

exchange problems between Switzerland and Slovakia wer e
ironed out , and a regular commercial treaty w i t h a mutual
agreement to increase trade as m uch as- possible f o l l o w e d „
On July 11, the Swiss press announced the conclusion of
arrangements to improve the transport of goods f rom Rumania,
Bulgaria and other countries in the Near and Middle East
through Germany to S w i t z e r l a n d „

The major discussions

^Medlicott, Economic Blockade „ II, 20S~2Q9o
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were concluded after eight months of negotiations by the
signing of a German-Swiss trade agreement on July IS, 1941°
By the terms of the agreement, w h i c h was to last up
to the end of 1942, Germany agreed to deliver 200,000 tons
of coal per mo n t h to S w i t z e r l a n d 0
was 150,000 tons per m o n t h 0

The amount before June 1#

Negotiations over iron ore

had caused a great deal of difficulty and Germany finally
agreed to deliver 13,500 tons per m o n t h of iron and steel
without imposing conditions as to its u s e 0

This amount

did not include the 5,000 to 6,000 tons of iron and nonferrous metals w h i c h Germany supplied to Switzerland for
the manufacture of goods ordered for German use.

Copper

and other meta l s for such manufactures were also to be
suppliedo

The Reich agreed,

in addition, to supply each

m onth 14,500 tons of petroleum products,

including petrol

14,650 tons), fuel oil (1,000 tons for industrial use
only), diesel engine oil
(1,200 tons).

(1,000 tons) and lubricating oil

These products were to be delivered p r i n 

cipally from R u m a n i a n stocks,

but if Rumanian supplies were

not forthcoming Germany promised to keep up the supply from
its own stockso

Payments wer e to be made through the Swiss-

Rumanian clearing.

As in the past, Switzerland was to send

its own tan k w a g o n s to fetch the o i l 0

The r e maining German

exports to Switzerland consisted of sugar
seeds

(4,000 tons, the usual amount),

quintals),

oats

(5,000 hectoliters),

potato seeds

(20,000 quintals), barley

(200,000

(20,000 quintals)
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and fertilizers

(250 s,000 quintals K 2$

Switzerland s in return, agreed to continue exports
of certain agricultural produce and manufactured goods to
Germany and to grant Germany advances on the clearing agree
ment o

Such advances were not to exceed 450 million Swiss

francs at the end of 1941s, 650 million by June 30, 1942,
and $50 million by December 3 1 » 1 9 4 2 »

The Swiss advances

were subject to Germany?s supplying the raw material required
for goods to be manufactured, to the export capacity of the
country, and to the import of goods produced in Switzerland„
Repayment, of the outstanding amounts by deliveries of coal
and iron by Germany after 1941 was foreseen,,29
When informing Britain of the agreements the Swiss
estimated that twenty per cent of their exports were con
trolled by Germany and Italy by ‘Geleltscheine„

Of the re

maining eighty per cent, ten per cent was on the "free
list," while the Swiss controlled the rest on the basis
of normal exports in 1937-193$°3®

Concessions to Great

Britain by Switzerland in the form of increased export
quotas amounted to only 100 million francs and were found
to be of little practical value031

Britain consequently

2%5edlicott, Economic Blockade,, II, 209-2100
29Ibido, 210-11„
3°Ibido, 212o
31Ibido » 211o

li?

decided to w i t h d r a w facilities for practically all Swiss
imports with the exception of f o o d s t u f f s , fodders and oil
and fats for soap-making.

In essence;, Britain refused to

allow any further imports of raw material by Switzerland
w h i c h could benefit the Axis c o u n t r i e s 0
and later A n g l o - American efforts,

In short,

British,

to secure restrictions of

Swiss exports in this period failed
British proposals to sever economic connections w i t h
Switzerland and to include the Swiss in the blockade of the
Axis countries were frequently considered but always p ost
poned

In. addition to reasons previously considered , it

became more important to avoid pushing the Swiss into a
diplomatic rupture, or worse, wit h Germany,

since S w i t z e r 

land had u n d e rtaken the diplomatic representation of B r i 
tish and American interests in enemy c o u n t r i e s 0

Switzer

land ys situation negated Allied attempts to obtain real
concessions throughout 1942 and the first half of 1943°
Negotiations to reach an agreement proceeded throughout'
1942, but it g radually became evident that the Swiss were
not prepared to risk offending G e r m a n y 0
The Swiss Government did not feel compelled to
change Its policy m a r k e d l y In the A l l i e s 1' favor, even after
the Allied landings in North Africa

The British soon

realized that it was not merely concern for neutrality,

^Medlicott, Economic Blockade, II, 2 1 2 0

lid

nor even a hea l t h y fear of German retaliations, which d e t e r 
mined Swiss policyo

Although these circumstances were

certainly i m p o r t a n t ? they were additional to the influence
of Swiss manufacturers who were conducting a highly p r o f it
able wartime trade w i t h Germany*33

The situation at the

end of 1942 found Switzerland and the Allies prepared to
agree on a "compensation d e a l / ’ whereby goods would be
exchanged between Switzerland ? Britain and the United
States to the value of 2^ million f r a n c s »

An agreement

along these lines was signed on December 14? 1942? but it
was subject to G e r m a n y 5s consent on the one hand and on
the other to Swiss acceptance of a formidable Allied demand
for progressive reduction of Swiss exports of arms and
machinery to G e r m a n y 0

Neither condition could be s e c u r e d 03^

Germany made its adherence to the "compensation
d e a l ” conditional on the conclusion of a new German-Swiss
trade agreement but as an interim measure agreed to a r e 
duction in the amount of Swiss goods sent to G e r m a n y *

W he n

German-Swiss negotiations were suspended on January 15? 1943?
the Swiss Government suspended the credit facilities granted
to Germany in 1941 and discontinued its guarantee of Swiss
exports to the Reich*

In the meantime? trade continued

on a "hand-to-mouth" basis w i t h a considerable decrease

3 3 Toynbee? W a r and the Neutrals ? 77“ 7 $ 0
34 Ibido , 780
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in Swiss exports to G e r m a n y 0^5
»

By January 1943 > Germany was already behind in its
coal deliveries to Switzerland, as defined in the 1941
agreemento

Germany now demanded that Swiss exports to the

Axis countries of raw materials and mach i n e r y for the d u r a 
tion of the new agreement be maintained at not less than
their previous levels, a l t hough Switzerland would be c o m 
pelled to go short of products for its own economic and
defense n e e d s 0

Further demands included restoration of

Swiss exports of agricultural and dairy products to the
early 1942 level and r eduction of Swiss exports of machines
and machine tools to neutral countries such as Spain, which
had recently placed large o r d e r s T h e

Swiss were prepared

to finance orders to the extent of the balance remaining
out of the 1941 a g r e e m e n t , but refused to agree to fresh
financing of exports to Germany on the same l i n e s 0
Although the Germans used the threat of a ,Tpreven
tive occupation” of Switzerland as a means of economic
pressure in M a r c h 1943 » it was not likely that the Reich
would attempt an occupation*,

Effective reprisals could be

applied by r e d ucing or cutting off Swiss supplieso

Even

this measure was not necessarily in G e r m a n y vs interest,
since it meant corresponding loss of Swiss e x p o r t s 0

^^Toynbee, W a r and the N e u t r a l s 9 ?B0
-^Medlicott,

Economic B l o c k a d e , II, 4 9 9 “ $00»

It
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appeared to the Allies that Switzerland- was not doing
enough to secure from Germany the maximum limit of conces
sions „

On the contrary, there seemed good reason to believe

that Switzerland was seeking the maximum limit of Allied
concessions in the interest of its exporting industries
The American Minister to Berne cabled Secretary
of State Cordell Hull on April 9, 1943 that the Swiss were
about to conclude a new trade agreement with Germany but
that the Swiss officials had assured him that everything
possible was being done to bring about a satisfactory
reduction in what the Allies considered to be undesirable
exports to the Axis.. Hull, in reply, ordered Leland Har
rison, the American Minister in Berne, to make clear to
the Swiss that, !!pending clarification of Switzerland's
position, we would suspend, with certain exceptions, all
export licenses and navicerts covering Swiss imports <>"3$
However, the Swiss Government, influenced by Swiss
industrialists and the fear of the political consequences
of unemployment resulting from the fall of Swiss imports
to Germany, more than by serious belief in German invasion,
virtually surrendered to German demands in April 1943»
Germany undertook to supply the arrears of coal and iron
outstanding under the 1941 agreement, leaving the Swiss
^ M e d l i c o t t „-Economic Blockade, II, 49$.
^^Cordell Hull, The Memoirs of Cordell Hull, II
(LIoj 194$), 1349o /Hereafter cited as Hull, Memoirs.7
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Government with no choice but to restore its guarantee
on all orders placed by Germany0

Moreover, the Swiss had

been surprised to discover that there were still about
3 5 0 ,000,000 francs’ worth of former credit outstanding;
the whole of it was taken up by orders placed in early
January 1943 > indicating that there would be a substantial
increase in Swiss deliveries to Germany in the next months0
During the previous three months German coal deliveries
had been one-third less than the agreed 150,000 tons per
month.

Total arrears under the old agreement were roughly

950,000 tonso

Germany proposed to liquidate the balance

over a four month period, while Switzerland continued to
execute the orders covered by the credit balance,

Ger

many was to be given further credit facilities based on
the extent to which coal deliveries exceeded 150,000 tons
per month, and delivery of an additional 1,£00,000 tons
of coal and coke products was visualized over a period of
a year,39
The Swiss concessions amounted to a reversal of the
trend of February and March 1943 when Swiss exports to
Germany declined.

The agreement reached between Germany

and Switzerland reduced by twenty per cent some of the
headings in which the Allies were interested but did not
rule out the granting of further credit facilities to
^^Medlicott, Economic Blockade, II, 500-501o
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Germany based on coal deliveries . ^

The Allies, therefore,

placed a temporary embargo on the issuance of navicerts
and export licenses for Switzerland,
The June 1943 agreement represented the last time
that Germany was able to impose its will on Switzerland
economically.

Militarily the tide had turned against the

Axis with the loss of the Sixth Army at Stalingrad, the
Allied landing in North Africa and the subsequent defeat
of Rommel's forces.

As defeat of the Axis became increas

ingly apparent in 1943 > the Allied position in economic
negotiations increased correspondingly.
The most potent Allied weapon was the black list,
the significance of which at this stage of the war was the
fear it created of ostracism from post-war markets.

Among

the Swiss there developed a corresponding tendency to adopt
a bolder line toward Germany, partially through decreased
fear of German retaliation and partly through the desire to
avoid the bad debts of a defeated customer.
In discussions with Swiss delegates in London, the
Allies abandoned their earlier understanding policy,

British

and American pressure induced one Swiss firm after another
to restrict trade.with Germany,

What the earlier embargo

had failed to achieve was quickly granted before the end
of 1943»

As early as June 1943 , a group of Swiss firms
^ T o y n b e e , War and the Neutrals, 7$“79°
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agreed to limit their exports of fuses to Germany by twenty
five per cent in return for removal from the black list.^1
The Allied-Swiss negotiations resulted in the
signature of an agreement in London on December 19, 1943
whereby the Swiss agreed to reduce exports of arras, ammu
nition and machinery to the Axis by forty-five per cento
The export of the most strategic manufactures, such as
ball bearings, fuses and precision tools, was even more
drastically reduced— sixty per cent below the 1942 level.
The Swiss further agreed to prevent•concentration of these
exports in the early months of 1944, to send no such ex
ports to Italy, to reduce exports proportionally whenever
any part of Axis territory was liberated, and to make no
credit commitments to the Axis without first consulting
the Allies,

In return, the Allies restored the food and

fodder export quotas to Switzerland as they existed in
April 1943 but coupled their restoration with a probition
against the export of dairy products.^
Following the Normandy invasion and the landing
in southern France, the British and Americans made new
demands on the Swiss on September IS, 1944..

In return for

immediate and long-term concessions, the Swiss were asked
to embargo all exports to Germany of certain specified
^Toynbee, War and the Neutrals, 79.
^ H u l l , Memoirs, 1349-50,
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strategic commodities and to reduce to a prewar level the
transit traffic between Germany and -Italy.

On October 1,

Switzerland prohibited the export of arms, ammunition,
explosives, airplanes and parts and bearings
At the end of October, the Simplon, but not the
Gotthard route, was closed to transit traffic.

Germany

no longer represented the major concern for the Swiss,
and they concentrated their efforts on future relations
with Allies.

In January 1945, an Allied delegation met

in Berne, and in April all its requirements were met.
Carriage of coal iron, scrap iron and steel from Germany
to Italy was prohibited.

Other traffic was reduced to

nominal amounts, total Swiss exports to Germany reduced
to token figures and the Swiss supply of electricity to
Germany cut o f f . ^
The Swiss Government further agreed to prevent the
use of Swiss territory for the disposal, concealment, or
reception of assets illegally taken during the war.

A

Swiss decree had already blocked German funds, and the
Government undertook to purchase no more gold from Germany
except that needed for diplomatic expenses.

In return,

the Allies announced that there was no longer any blockade
reason for limiting Swiss imports.
^ H u l l , Memoirs» 1349-50.
^Toynbee, War and the Neutrals. Si.
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Germany’s economic policy toward Switzerland during
the war was directed to attain two objectives„

First of

all, the Reich intended to assume most, if not all, of
Switzerland’s exports which it needed„

And second, it was

equally urgent that the Reich prevent, as far as possible.
Allied import of Swiss materials of war potential„

From

1939 to 1943? because of British hesitation to extend the
blockade to include the Swiss, Germany continually increased
its imports from Switzerland and at the same time secured
a large credit on which to make further purchases0

German

control of coal, upon which the Swiss were dependent, pro
vided the Reich with a major bargaining advantage,,

If the

embargo on coal failed to produce the desired results,
there remained the threat of German occupation of Switzer
land o

The embargo of 1941 led to a highly satisfactory

agreement for Germany, and the threat of a "preventive
occupation" in 1943 undoubtedly influenced Swiss exporters
enough to produce another satisfactory agreement even though
the Reich had failed to maintain its supply of coal to the
Swisso
After the fall of France, the German occupation
of Switzerland appears to have been feared to a greater
extent in London than in Berne„

Until 1943» the Ministry

of Economic Warfare hesitated to take any action that
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might force Switzerland into a conflict with the Reich and
a possible occupation of that state.

In Switzerland, the

fear of occupation subsided considerably after the FrancoGerman Armistice and to a large extent disappeared after
the beginning of the attack on Russia.

In essence, the

Swiss industrialists and exporters carried on a highly prof
itable war trade with Nazi Germany, just as they had done
with Imperial Germany during the first World War.

Thus by

1943 s Germany obtained extensive Swiss materials while
successfully limiting the Allied imports from Switzerland.
However, 1943 proved to be the turning point in the
contest for Swiss exports.

The Allied victories induced

them to adopt a new policy toward the Swiss.

Use of the

black list achieved immediate results with the Swiss ex
porters who were now willing to decrease exports to Germany
in return for removal from the list.

Germany by late 1943

was in no position to make reprisals, and Swiss exports
to the Reich continued to decrease throughout 1943 s 1944
and 1945*

By the end of the war, the Swiss found themselves

aligned closely to the Allies, in almost complete opposi
tion to their policy six years earlier..

CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
With the accession to power of the National Social
ist Party in January 1933? Germany initiated its efforts
to bring about the incorporation of all Germans in a ’’great
German Reicha”

The Nazi press and party members in foreign

countries played upon the frustration and resentment of
Germans living under foreign governments„

Such propaganda

and agitation was particularly successful in Austria, a
predominantly German state favoring union with Germany,
and among the Sudeten Germans of Czechoslovakia who were
allegedly oppressed by the Czech government„

The doctrine

of ’’self-determination of peoples” gained wide'support
in both countries and provided some justification for
Hitler!,s concept of a ’’greater Germany,,”
In Switzerland, however, the opposite occurred«,
Although the Swiss were predominantly German, Nazi racist
propaganda and agitation met with strong resistance„

Un

like Austria and Czechoslovakia, Switzerland contained no
mass of discontented Germans to whom National Socialism
could appealo

In addition to the German-speaking Swiss,

the state contained substantial French and Italian minor
ities, but under its federal form of government the Swiss
12?
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had found the answer to the difficulties arising from the
conclusion of three separate nationalities within its
borderso

In essence, the de-emphasis of race held the

state together and produced a Swiss nationalism which
replaced separate German, French and Italian nationalism.
National Socialism, with its emphasis on the union of all
Germans represented a threat to Swiss independence , which
the Swiss, particularly the German Swiss, had fought to
preserve since the thirteenth century„

For this reason.

The Swiss were not anxious to see National Socialism gain
a foothold in Switzerland„

The threat of Nazi Germany dif

fered little from the threat presented to the Swiss in
the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries by the Habsburg
emperorso
Nazi propagandists were unable to differentiate
between the Germans of Austria and Czechoslovakia and the
German Swiss0

Their refusal to adapt their propaganda

to the situation in Switzerland represented a major reason
for Germany’s failure to incorporate Switzerland into the
Reicho

Even against the continued suggestions from German

diplomats in Berne, the Nazi press persisted in its emphasis
on incorporating all Germans in the Reich, while attacking
Swiss authorities and institutions0

By the outbreak of the

war, the German press was attacking the Swiss as traitors
to their own blood0

Consequently, National Socialism made

few converts in Switzerland„

On the contrary, it led to a
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resurgence of Swiss patriotisms, and the Swiss began to
take measures to improve the countryfs military forces»
The Fuehrer himself apparently formulated no def
inite policy toward Switzerland other than the general de
sire to unite all Germans in the Reich0

Since favorable

conditions for an Anschluss failed to materialize, Hitler
contented himself with Switzerland's gradual return to
absolute, armed neutrality„

By 1 9 3 'the Swiss had been

released from the responsibility of participating in
League sanctions and restated their intention to defend
Swiss neutrality and independence against any aggressor—
German as well as Frencho

Switzerland’s intention to

defend its frontiers against any aggressor coincided with
Germany’s military interests;, for it meant that a poten
tial French attack through Switzerland into southern Ger
many would be strongly resisted if not prevented0
Hitler’s respect for the concept of neutrality
played no role in Germany’s failure to incorporate Swit
zerland o

Had circumstances or needs demanded an invasion

of Switzerland, Hitler would not have been adverse to vio
lating the co u ntry'‘’s neutrality,,

During the course of

the war the position of Switzerland in German strategy
simply did not justify an attack on that state0

The suc

cess of the Hitler-Manstein plan against France in 1940
made consideration of outflanking the Maginot Line through
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Switzerland unnecessary,,

Postwar accounts by personalities

involved in the planning and execution of the operation
indicate that an attack through Switzerland was not even
considered„
Following the fall of France, Hitler was deeply
involved in an attempt to reach a negotiated peace with
Britain and hesitated to engage in another operation until
sure of Britain Ss attitude„

By late July 1940, it was

obvious that Britain intended to continue the war, and
Hitler accordingly issued the directive for Operation
Sealion, which was followed in five months by the direc
tive for the attack on Russia0
Preparations for an attack on Switzerland pro
ceeded simultaneously throughout the simmer and fall of
1940, but no date for execution of the operation was ever
issuedo

The High Command stipulated that September was

the most favorable month for an operation against Swit
zerland but allowed the planning to continue well into
October, thus postponing the operation for at least a
year0

However, by June 1941 Germany had begun its offen

sive against Russia0

It is unlikely that either Hitler

or the High Command considered removing forces from the
Russian front to engage in a relatively unrewarding attack
on Switzerland0

The initiation of the Russian campaign,

as much as any other event, prevented a German occupation
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of Switzerlando

Hitler undoubtedly intended to come to

terms with Switzerland after Russia was defeated»
During the first four years of the w a r 9 Germany
and Switzerland were able to come to terms in regard to
German wartime economy„

After the fall of France , Ger

many found in Switzerland a source of material which could
effectively be channeled into the German war effort0 At
the same time it was possible to prevent Swiss exports to
the Allies since Switzerland was almost completely sur
rounded by Axis territory<,

By cutting off its coal supply

to Switzerland, Germany could secure favorable trade agree
ments and reduce Swiss exports to Britain0

The Swiss made

the most of their situation by exporting manufactured goods
and certain agricultural products to Germany and reaping
large profits in return.,

The favorable economic relations

with the Swiss during the Russian campaign tended to minimize the necessity of incorporation Switzerland into the
Reicho
A German invasion of Switzerland between 1940 and
1943 could offer Germany no advantages which would outweigh
the possible consequences0

It was well known in Germany

that the Gotthard and Simplon tunnels would be destroyed
by the Swiss in the first hours of the attack0

Unless

this could be prevented, Germany faced the loss of the
most efficient transportation route to Italy0

In addition,
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the devastation of Swiss industry, or its destruction by
the Swiss before retreating into the central massif, meant
the end of Switzerland’s contributions to Germany’s war
efforto

Militarily, the occupation of Switzerland threatened

to be a long and expensive campaign in the Alps against
Swiss guerrilla forces„

For these reasons, Germany was

not anxious to attack Switzerland while engaged in an
attack on Russia0

The threat of an invasion was usually

sufficient to obtain economic concessions„
By 1943? the Allies had turned the tide, allowing
Great Britain to adopt a hard line in economic negotia
tions with the Swisso

The use of the black list proved

effective in breaking Nazi domination of Swiss exports
without greatly risking a German invasion of the country
since Germany’s military position was continually deterioratingc

Swiss exports to Germany declined after 1943 as

an Allied victory became more of a certainty0

By the

fall of 1944 Germany had lost most of its control over
Switzerlando

The Swiss in turn worked to insure them

selves a favorable position with the victors„
There is no question that Nazi Germany intended
to force the Swiss into the Reich sooner or later, but
a definite decision was never taken0

The most favorable

method would have been an Anschluss, but National Social
ism failed to make significant converts among the Swiss0
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Hitler consequently had to be satisfied with Swiss neutral
ity and economic concessions until an.attack could be un
dertaken.

However, German involvement with France, Britain

and then Russia prevented serious consideration of an
occupation of Switzerland until the major enemies were
disposed of, a task which Germany failed to complete,
Switzerland, in the meantimes, remained the only indepen
dent country in central Europe0
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OKH Operations Staff's initial conception of Operation Tannenbaum.
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Appendix B

Operation Tannenbaum as revised by General von Leeb.
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St

Operation Tannenbaum as revised by General Franz Haider.
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partment publication, National Socialism, is a collection
of photostated documents concerning the history and or
ganization of the party’s Foreign Organization,,

The work

is particularly valuable for its account of the activity
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and goals of the Foreign Organization in countries outsid®
the Reicho

The Documents on British Foreign Policy, 1919-

19.39 contribute little to describing German-Swiss relations0
However, the third series provided important information
on the Franeo-British negotiations concerning the joint
guarantee of Swiss, Dutch and Belgian neutrality<,

The

three collections concerned with the trials of war crim
inals at Nuremberg provided little information on Nazi
activity in Switzerland„

Since no major crimes were

committed in Switzerland, the Allied prosecuters gen
erally did not question the defendants on the subject
of plans for an operation against Switzerland0

The

Kriegstagebueh des Oberkommando des Wehrmacht -is essen
tially the OKW diary for the war years and provides a
day by day account of activity at OKW headquarters0
The work contained no mention of Operation Tannenbaum
in 1940 nor of plans for a preventive occupation of
Switzerland in 1943«

Planning for the attack on Swit

zerland during 1940, however, was basically a task of
the High Command of the Army (OKH), and evidently OKW
was not concerned with the operation<>

In addition, the

diary begins in August 1940, while the initial orders
for Operation Tannenbaum were given in JuneD

General

Guisanfs Bericht an die Bundesversammlung is a summary
of planning and activity undertaken by the Swiss Army
under General Guisan0

His report proved valuable for
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its discussion of the danger to Switzerland during the
German western offensive of 1940o

The discussion of

the possible preventive occupation of Switzerland in
1943 indicated that OKW was seriously considering the
operation, and that the Swiss were seriously expecting
an attack,.
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Schacht, Hjalmar Horace Greeley.
Confessions of the
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Of the nondocumentary primary sources, The
Memoirs of Ernst von Weizsaeker provide an account of
the influence of the Nazi Party in German diplomacy in
Switzerland,

Although decidedly biased, Weizsaeker

traced the course of German-Swiss relations during his
stay in Switzerland from 1933-1936 as Germany's Minister
to Switzerland,

He maintains that Germany had no inten

tion of ever attacking Switzerland,

The diary of Ber

nard Barbey, Guisan's personal Chief of Staff, proved
valuable as a source of information on the Swiss General
Staff and its activities during the war.

Like Guisan's

Bericht an die Bundesversammlung, Barbey’s diary indi
cates that the Swiss were prepared for a German invasion
of Switzerland in 1940 and feared a possible attack in
March 1943°

Von Lossberg9s Im Wehrmachtfuehrungstab

provides an account of the OKW planning for an attack
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on Switzerland after the fall of France,

Unfortunately,

his account is brief and quite vague; the author was
unable even to supply the date for the operation,

Loss

berg believed that Hitler gave the initial order for
planning to begin,

Walter Sehellenbergfs Memoirs is the

only other account concerned with Switzerland in any
detail,

Sehellenberg maintains that through his influ

ence with Heinrich Himmler, he was able to influence
Hitler fs decision not to attack Switzerland in March
1943o

However 3 postwar investigation indicates that

Germany had no real intention of attacking the Swiss in
1943°

Consequently, Sehellenberg fs account seems less

reliable.
Neither Mansteinfs Lost Victories nor Warlimont?s
In Hitlergs Headquarters make mention of a possible at
tack on Switzerland,

General Haider ?s Private War Jour

nal contains several brief references to Switzerland,
indicating that OKH may have been concerned with an
operation against the Swiss,

However, no definitive plan

for Operation Tannenbaum is discussed,

B o r ?s Gespraeche

mit Haider, an account of the author¥s postwar conver
sations with the former chief of staff, is similarly
silent on the subject of Switzerland,
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The major secondary sources concerning Swiss neu
trality, Swiss Neutrality:

Its History and Meaning, and

Neutrality as the Principle of Swiss Foreign Policy, are
both short, concise works which trace the development of
Swiss neutrality from its inception to the present da y 0

the same reason and provided considerable material on
the early history of the Swiss Confederation„
The three works by the Swiss author, H 0R 0 Kurz,
formed the basis for the discussion of Switzerland's posi
tion in Nazi strategy0

Die Schweiz in der Planung der

Kriegfuehrenden Maechte waehrent des Zweiten Weltkrieges
is based upon the records of the OKH Operations Staff
which was responsible for the preparations for Operation
4.

Tannenbaumo

4.
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A.

Die Schweiz im Zweiten Weltkrieg provided
i

additional information on German plans for an invasion of
Switzerland as well as general information concerning or
ganization of the Swiss Army and certain aspects of Swiss
defensive strategy <>

Duerrenmatt?s Kleine Geschichte der

Schweiz waehrend des Zweiten Weltkrieges covers the effects
of the war on the Swiss in general terms, including activi
ties of Nazi agents in Switzerland, Allied bombing of Swiss
towns, the Swiss mobilization and war effort„

Spying for

'Peace
i£ based on General Guxsan's •
Bericht
an die
1
'11
.. T.... 11'
■...r
n,m " Bundes" .
versammlung and General Barbey's diary <>

Basically the

work is concerned with Guisan's leadership during the
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course of the war„

The author credits the general with

preventing a German occupation of Switzerland in 1940,
and in general, maintaining the army in a state of readi
ness which discouraged a German invasion0
Chief of Intelligence, The Secret Front, and Canaris
all provided an insight into the activities of Admiral Can
aris and General Schellenberg in Switzerland, both of whom
allegedly worked to discourage a German attack on Switzer
land „
The Economic Blockade, based upon records of the
British Ministry of Economic Warfare, provided the most
complete discussion of German-Swiss economic relations
during the w a r 0

Additional information on economic mat

ters was found in The War and.the Neutrals, edited by
Toynbeeo

However, both sources cover the subject from

the British viewpoint»
The Drafting of the Covenant by D 0H 0 Miller, who
attended the Versailles Peace Conference with the American
delegation, covers in depth Switzerland’s efforts to se
cure entrance into the League„

The work is based on pri

mary sources 0
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The New York Times represents one of the most
valuable sources of information on Germany’s relations
with Switzerland, particularly for the period 1933 to
1940o

Accounts of German violations of Swiss neutrality,

Swiss protests, Nazi activity in Switzerland and Swiss
defensive measures were useful in determining Germany’s
attitude toward Swiss neutrality„

In addition, the

Times carried important accounts from German and Swiss
papers 0
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Periodical sources, in general, were valuable
for contemporary accounts of German activity in Switzer™
land.

The articles by R.A. Friedman, Ernest Hediger and

G.E.W„ Johnson provided the best accounts of Switzerland*s
situation during the Nazi era and German attempts to
extend National Socialism to Switzerland.
Trevor'-Roper’s short article on Admiral Canaris
generally disproves the myth of Canaris as the head of
the German resistance and casts considerable doubt on
the Admiral’s ability as head of Germany’s military in
telligence o
H.Jo Morgenthau, R.C. Brooks and Walter Zahler
discussed Switzerland’s position in the League of Na
tions and provided additional information on Switzerland’s
attempt to reconcile neutrality and collective security.

